Meaning, Truth, and God ed. by Leroy S. Rouner (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 465 object of metaphysics seems taken to mean that existence tout court is the object of the discipline, as though there were difference between Phelan 's view in this regard and Elders's own interpretation that for Aquinas existence is das f ormelle Element (p. 133) in the concept of das Seiende. Notwithstanding these observations, however, Elders's coverage is amply sufficient for its stated purpose of an introduction to a deeper study of Thomistic metaphysics, and its use of illustrations from modern philosophy can serve as an incentive for further exploration of problematics that are common to Aquinas and to present-day thinkers. The volume is neatly produced, and is remarkably free from typographical errors. Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Toronto, Canada JOSEPH OWENS Meaning, Truth, and God, edited by LEROY S. ROUNER. (Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, Vol. 3.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982. Pp. 240. Meaning, Truth, and God, edited by Leroy S. Rouner as the third volume in the series Boston University Studies in Philosophy and Religion, is a collection of essays, by various contributors, supposedly having to do with the topic indicated by the title. As the editor informs us in the Introduction, the volume is intended to express a multifaceted concern that extends to (1) the logic of religious language, (2) the effect of social context on religious meanings, and (3) the reinterpretation of major nineteenth century thinkers. Regretably, with the exception of perhaps two essays, one by Hartshorne, the other by Burrell, scant attention is paid to the most fundamental concern of philosophical theology, viz., the truthclaim regarding God's existence and the question of His nature. What the reader is presented with instead is a theological tower of Babel whose various essays contribute little if anything to one's understanding of truth or God. In the review that follows I discuss the first eight essays of the volume and omit any discussion of the last three, the ones appearing in Part III entitled " The Reality of God." I have ignored these essays not because they are in any way inferior to those which precede them but because of the obvious limits of space and, to be more candid, to protest their failure to address the title of their section. In his essay " believing in God's Existence," Charles Hartshorne includes in summary form his well-known revised version of the ontological 466 BOOK REVIEWS argument as well as two additional arguments for God's existence also found in his writings. One is based upon the premise that cosmic order requires a divine orderer (according to Hartshorne's meaning of the word "divine"), the other, upon the concept that a supreme purpose for things requires as " the happiness or welfare of the creatures whether (as I think) in this life alone, or as, in some case at least, individually immortal but all somehow permanently enriching the divine life and its happiness" (p. 27). Consistent with his Whiteheadian process philosophy Hartshorne reiterates certain claims about God that would not be acceptable to classical theism (which he rejects because of its apparent inability to allow for the freedom of the creature or for a solution to the problem of evil) and which seemingly conflict with orthodox Christian teaching: e.g. (1) God, in his "concrete actuality," is constantly changing, (2) his knowledge is variable and he lacks infallible knowledge of the future, and (3) he is in nowise the cause of the creature's actions. Throughout this essay Hartshorne offers numerous value observations about philosophers with whose thought he is presumably familiar (among the ancients Aristotle seems to be his favorite, and among the moderns Peirce and Whitehead). 'Vhile such off-the-cuff remarks make the essay more interesting fare, unfortunately they are sometimes accompanied by highly questionable assertions concerning the doctrines of these philosophers (e.g. Aristotle held that for the concrete there are only approximately or probabilistically sufficient conditions and Hume assumes that all events are causally completely determined by their predecessors). In the essay that follows, "Verification in Matters Religious,'' David Burrell investigates the rational basis for belief in such a proposition as God...