Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical Theology by Anthony Kenny (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 709 Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical Theology. By ANTHONY KENNY. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. x + 182. $24.95 (cloth). This volume collects eleven of Anthony Kenny's essays, written over a period of almost thirty years. Six of them have previously appeared in print; the other five are published here for the first time. As the volume's subtitle indicates, all of them discuss topics in the area of philosophical theology. The collection as a whole nicely illustrates the wide range of Kenny's work in philosophical theology during the past three decades. This hook will he of particular interest to the readers of this journal; the index records more references to Thomas Aquinas than to anyone else. Within the hounds of a brief review, I cannot discuss each of ,the essays in detail. So I shall limit myself to doing two things. In order to give readers a sense of .the scope of the collection, I shall first summarize its contents; in order to convey an idea of its philosophical in· terest, I shall then make some critical remarks about :the views set forth in the three most recent essays, all dated 1986. The volume is divided into four parts. Each part gathers together essays that share themes or concerns. Thus the first part, which contains two papers from 1964, focuses on the nature of theological thinking . In "The Use of Logical Analysis in Theology," Kenny advances the claim that many contemporary philosophical discussions are of immediate relevance to theology and argues for it by example. The example involves the use of analytic metaphysics as practiced by such philosophers as Anscomhe, Geach and Strawson both to explicate and to criticize the Tridentine understanding of the doctrine of Transubstantiation . "The Development of Ecclesiastical Doctrine" outlines the difficulties history raises for the view that Catholic dogma is immutable. Kenny is harshly critical of attempts to explain away all the apparent changes of doctrine in the historical record by means of such ad hoc devices as representing them as merely making explicit what had been implicitly believed all along or writing down what had been orally transm1tted for many generations. He argues that such explanations can account for some hut not all of the doctrinal change history reveals. The second part of the volume, which is about the nature and existence of God, contains two papers dating from the 1960s on divine necessity, a recent discussion of the argument from design, and an older piece analyzing the description by John of the Cross of mystical experi· ence. In "God and Necessity," Kenny proposes an analysis of proposi· tional necessity according to which a necessary proposition is one which never changes its truth-value. Because it is usually supposed that God 710 BOOK REVIEWS exists always or never, this analysis has rthe consequence that rthe propo· sition that God exists is necessary. But so too are propositions ascribing existence to everlasting entities such as the proposition that Demo· critean atoms exist. Indeed, as Kenny explicitly notes in "Necessary Being," if polythene is literally indestructible (and has always existed), then the proposition that polyithene exists is a necessary truth hut not, of course, a logically necessary truth. " The Argument from Design " contends that teleological explanations in terms of purpose cannot be ultimate hut must be reducible either to mechanistic explanations or to explanations in terms of design. So the fate of the design argument hangs on whether there is purpose in nature that is both irreducible to a product of mechanistic chance and necessity and has no designer in the natural world. And in "Mystical Experience: St. John of the Cross," Kenny casts doubt on the suitability of the contemplative state of union with God described by John for justifying belief in God. As he sees it, rthere are difficulties involved in knowing that anyone is in such a contemplative state. John allows that a person may think he is contemplating when he is not and may he contemplating without knowing it, and he gives no reason for supposing that the tranquility and virtue he takes to he effects of contemplation cannot occur in the absence of contemplation. The...