The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics by Jean Porter, and: On Faith: Summa Theologiae 2-2, qq. 1–16 of St. Thomas Aquinas tr. by Mark D. Jordan (review)

BOOK REVIEWS The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics. By JEAN PORTER. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990. Pp. 208. $24.95 (cloth). On Faith: Summa Theologiae 2-2, qq. 1-16 of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by MARK D. JoRDAN. Readings in the Summa the· ologiae, Vol. 1. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. 208. $9.95 (paper). Two recent publications well serve the growing interest in what Aquinas has to say about virtue, human and divine. First, Jean Porter carefully studies the general " moral theory of Thomas Aquinas's Summa theologiae in the light of the problematics of contemporary Christian ethics, Protestant as well as Catholic " (p. 13) . Her work incorporates a readable introduction to the main components of Aquinas's moral philosophy: a realist conception of the good, the instantiation of that good in the world of human actions and goals, and the ordering of choice towards the good through virtue. Secondly, Mark Jordan introduces a new translation in a " spare but accessible English" (p. 18) of the treatise on faith (Summa theologiae Ha-Hae qq, 1-16). Since both volumes concern the secunda pars of Aquinas's Summa theologiae, we can suitably examine their merits in this single review. The Recovery of Virtue aims at drawing the thought of Aquinas into a clearer dialogue with those who write about theological ethics in the English-speaking world. Accordingly, Porter prefaces her fine study with a fair, though brief, survey of Catholic moral theology since Vatican II and summary accounts of the dominant themes in the works of Gene Outka, James Gustafson, and Stanley Hauerwas. She th.en turns to a " reconstruction of the more strictly philosophical components " of Aquinas's moral theory as contained in the Summa theologiae. In chapter 2, Porter explains some basic notions which undergird Aquinas's general theory of morals, for example, his notion of goodness as something real; the premise that what is good or best for anyone is so in virtue of its being of a certain kind; the assertion that the self remains a legitimate " object " of theological charity; the view that one discovers intelligibility and organization within the created order; and finally, the conviction that the final perfection of the ra141 142 BOOK REVIEWS tional creature transcends the limits which creatureliness itself imposes. In chapter 3, Porter gives a fine account of Aquinas's action theory, illustrated by the sorts of good examples that Aquinas himself would have used today. Thomas Gilby once remarked that end so dominates the secunda pars that it should he read through to say what it means. Porter's first three chapters render a clear, organized analysis of Aquinas's moral teleology. Still, I would like to raise two small issues which may suggest lines for further inquiry. First, Porter asks whether Aquinas's teleological frame of reference allows for performing actions " without reference to any wider aim" (p. 76). As examples of those things which one can simply desire for themselves, she proposes engagement in or with: " fine music, a life of service, chocolates, children, religious ecstasy, sexual ecstasy ... the list is endless" (loc. cit.). First of all, this list of examples seems to ignore a basic distinction between a finis cui and a finis cuius gratia, or the difference between something that is sought for itself and something which is sought for the sake of a further end. A person may never virtuously subordinate children and (service to) other people to his or her own goals or purposes (including delight). We can render them their due according to the diverse types of justice, even expect to receive something good from them in theological hope, and above all love them in theological charity. But we can never turn them into a finis cnius gratia. On the other hand, fine music, chocolates, and ecstasy both sexual and religious (if by the latter one means created thoughts and feelings about God and not union with God himself) always remain instrumental, that is, they can never virtuously serve as a finis cui. If we take Porter's example, Aquinas's teleological framework includes the chocolate ice-cream...