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MYSTERY AND EXPLANATION IN AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF CREATION MICHAEL LICCIONE Houston, Texas CONTEMPORARY philosophers of religion have devoted much worthy effort to analyzing and reconsidering such important traditional doctrines as those of divine omniscience and simplicity. But the similarly important and traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo has not been enjoy,ing the same kind of attention. One reason for this may be that its purport seems clearer, and its place in classical theism accordingly less controversial, than those of certain other doctrines, so that neither proponents nor opponents, are as much inclined to puzzle over it as over those other doctrines. But in Aquinas's magisterial account, at least one of the doctrine's aspects bears a philosophical interest that is easy to overlook. In this paper I will bring out that aspect by resolving two alleged inconsistencies in Aquinas's account. Two well-known writers have argued that Aquinas's explanation of God's creating is incompatible with his description of God's freedom in creating. In the late 1940s, most of the pertinent textual and philosophical matters were hotly debated between Lovejoy 1 on the one hand, who attacked the Common 1 Arthur 0. Lovejoy, "The Duality of Thomistic Theology: A Reply to Mr. Veatch," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 7 (1947): 413438 ; "Analogy and Contradiction: A Surrejoinder," Phil. Phen. Res. 7 (1947) : 626-34; "Necessity and Self-Sufficiency in the Thomistic Theology: A Reply to President Pegis," Phil. Phen. Res. 9 (1948) : 71-88; "Comment on Mr. Pegis' Rejoinder," Phil. Phen. Res. 9 (1948): 284-90. 223 224 MICHAEL LICCIONE Doctor's account as thus inconsistent, and Veatch 2 and Pegis 3 on the other hand, who defended it as both consistent and true. More recently, Kretzmann 4 has advanced a professedly tentative interpretation that offers what is, in effect, a weakened version of Lovejoy's attack; and though he refrains from citing Lovejoydoubtless for good reason-Kretzmann is only the latest exponent of a line of criticism that the great historian's influence has been largely responsible for sustaining. But even though my sympathies lie with such traditional Thomists as Veatch and Pegis, much of their treatment was as unnecessary as it was tortuous. Rather than rehearse the details of the older debate, then, I shall analyze the passages to which we should attend most closely, and then use them to show why Lovejoy and Kretzmann are wrong. That will in turn help to show that the existence of the world is both fully explicable and essentially mysterious. It is fully explicable inasmuch as God effectively wills it, with good and sufficient reason for doing so. It is essentially mysterious inasmuch as God freely wills it, with no reason to create rather than not, and no reason to create this world rather than any other he could have created. The question why the world exists thus has a good answer that preserves the wonder which Aristotle says is the beginning of philosophy. God's Reason for Creating Aquinas says that ... the distinction and multitude of things is from the intention (ex intentione) of the first cause, who is God. For he brought things into being in order that his goodness might be communicated 2 Henry Veatch, "A Note on the Metaphysical Grounds for Freedom, with Special Reference to Professor Lovejoy's Thesis in The Great Chain of Being ," Phil. Phen. Res. 7 (1947) : 391-412; "A Rejoinder to Professor Lovejoy ," Phil. Phen. Res. 7 (1947): 622-25. 3 Anton C. Pegis, "Principale Volitum: Some Notes on a Supposed Thomistic Contradiction," Phil. Phen. Res. 9 (1948): 51-70; Autonomy and Necessity : A Reply to Professor Lovejoy," Phil. Phen. Res. 9 (1948): 89-97. 4 Norman Kretzmann, "Goodness, Knowledge, and Indeterminacy in the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas," Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 63149 . AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF CREATION 225 (propter suam bonitatem communicandam) to creatures, and be represented by them. And because his goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, he produced many and diverse creatures ... (ST Ia Q47 Al).5 Therefore, God's creating the world is intentional: the intention is to communicate his goodness to creatures and adequately represent it by...

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