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THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUE IN AQUINAS JOHN PETERSON University ofRhode Island Kingston, Rhode Island THAT AQUINAS divided intellectual and moral virtue is well known. He also held that persons may be considered simply as natural beings, as, for example, Aristotle viewed them, or as natural beings that have a supernatural destiny . Viewed as the former, persons have a natural end just like every other thing. This natural end is identified by Aquinas with imperfect, as opposed to perfect or ultimate, happiness.1 But viewed as the latter, persons have a supernatural end. The natural end is not their final, eternal end but their secondary, temporal end. It is an end that is means to the final end. Moreover, it consists in rational activity, including acting rationally. This rational action, which is virtuous action, consists in striking a mean between excess and defect. Aquinas seems to agree with the view he ascribes to Aristotle, that in exercising this natural end of rational activity in this life humans are as happy as they can be here on earth but not absolutely or ultimately happy.2 But the supernatural end of persons is that in which they are ultimately happy. It is identified by Aquinas as acquaintance with God in the Beatific Vision.3 For convenience, the former viewpoint may 1 Aquinas agrees with the view he ascribes to Aristole that perfect happiness in this life is impossible. See ScG III, c. 48. 2 Ibid. 3 ScG III, c.37. 449 450 JOHN PETERSON be called moral naturalism (MN) and the latter moral supernaturalism (MS). MN is what Aquinas takes from Aristotle. He departs from Aristotle only in making the end in MN secondary instead of final. But MS is what he adds to Aristotle. And here the end he speaks about is the final end. As is obvious, one cannot identify the final end both with a life of reason on earth and with the Beatific Vision in heaven. But since it is not the same end or happiness that is concerned in MN and MS, Aquinas compatibly espouses both MN and MS. In any case, the distinctions between intellectual and moral virtue on the one hand and MN and MS on the other are evident in Aquinas's ethics. Not so evident is how these two distinctions are linked. In particular , I will show that intellectual virtue and moral virtue are the condition of each other both on the level of MN and on the level of MS. But though it holds on both levels, this interdependence on the level of MN is the converse of what it is on the level of MS. I To begin, in MN the tie between intellectual and moral virtue is the intellectual virtue of prudence. Through prudence, intellectual and moral virtue condition each other, but in different ways. Intellectual virtue is prior to moral virtue to the extent that prudence causally conditions moral virtue; moral virtue is prior to intellectual virtue to the extent that it logically conditions prudence. In MS, the tie between intellectual and moral virtue is not prudence but the Beatific Vision. Once again, intellectual virtue and moral virtue condition each other. But conversely , intellectual virtue is prior to moral virtue to the extent that the Vision logically conditions moral virtue; and moral virtue is prior to intellectual virtue to the extent that it causally conditions the Vision. In MN, acting morally is a matter of striking a mean between the extremes of excess and defect. This is rational action, natural happiness, or the moral end. In order to effect that moral end, care must be taken as regards the selection and ordering of INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL VIRTUE 451 means. To the extent that one does this well, one has the intellectual virtue of prudence. Prudence, therefore, "is a virtue that is necessary for the good life."4 But too often we meet persons who, though well disposed as regards the moral end, nonetheless fail to see or take the most appropriate means to that end. They aim at the golden mean but miss it due to ineptness in the use of means. Suppose a wealthy person, X...

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