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MARITAIN, THE INTUITION OF BEING, AND THE PROPER STARTING POINT FOR THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS MATTHEW S. PUGH University of St. Thomas Houston, Texas I ALL THOMISTS AGREE that being qua being is the proper subject of metaphysics, and few would deny that separatio is the means by which the intellect judges that being, in order to be such, need not be material, or changing. But certainly not all Thomists agree on what separatio presupposes. Some, such as John Wippel, deny that separatio presupposes knowledge of the existence of some being such as God or the soul.1 Others, such as Joseph Owens, maintain that only by knowing in advance that immaterial being exists can one conclude that being need not be realized in matter.2 Excellent arguments can be established on both sides of the debate, as its history has shown. But the arguments of neither side are entirely satisfactory, for each position has its disadvantages. Those who maintain that separatio presupposes knowledge of the existence of immaterial being hold metaphysics hostage to proofs for the existence of God, while those who maintain that separatio alone is sufficient for beginning metaphysics base metaphysics upon an empty concept, namely, negatively immaterial, neutral ens. 1 John F. Wippel, "Metaphysics and Separatio in Thomas Aquinas," Metaphysical Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 82. 2 Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1963). 405 406 MATTHEW S. PUGH Are Thomists, then, caught between the horns of a dilemma? Not necessarily. I contend that Jacques Maritain's philosophy of the intuition of being points the way out of the impasse, because Maritain's metaphysics provides a truly adequate account of how being qua being is apprehended by the mind. Both of the above-mentioned schools of thought fail to see that being qua being can be truly apprehended only in an eidetic visualization occurring at the third degree of formal abstraction, but grounded in a unique positive judgment of existence whose real import is gratuitously given to the intellect by nature. In particular, Wippel fails to understand the nature of separatio by severing its connection to the notion of primitive being taken from the intellect's apprehension of esse in judgment, and by failing to recognize that separatio is in itself a kind of formal abstraction. Owens, on the other hand, conceives being after the manner of a universal grasped via total abstraction, but somehow also super-generic.3 This intellectual operation, of course, presupposes the existence of at least one immaterial being; hence Owens's claim that one must first demonstrate God's existence before beginning metaphysics. Given the importance of this issue for Thomistic metaphysics, it is worth examining these claims in greater detail. II Maritain would agree with Wippel that because basic positive judgments of existence have sensibles for their subjects, the notion of being formulated from these judgments is never able to transcend the concrete, the changing, the material-never able to grasp being qua being. Wippel calls the notion of being based upon such judgments the primitive notion of being,4 while Maritain calls it the "vague" notion of being.5 Maritain would also agree that appeal must be made to a negative judgment 3 Ibid., 63-64. 4 According to Wippel, the metaphysician "may have arrived at what might be termed a primitive notion of being, that is, of being as restricted to the material and changing" ("Metaphysics and Separatio," 78). 5 Jacques Maritain, A Preface to Metaphysics: Seven Lectures on Being (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), 29-33. MARITAIN, BEING, THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS 407 (Thomas's separatio), if the vague or primitive notion of being is to be overcome. Furthermore, he would have no qualms about accepting Wippel's characterization of separatio, as far as it goes. For Wippel, separatio is The process through which the mind explicitly acknowledges and asserts that that by reason of which something is recognized as being need not be identified with that by which it is recognized as material being, or changing being, or being of a given kind. One may describe it as a negative judgment in that it denies that...

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