The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of Moral Responsibility

The Thomist 64 (2000): 423-48 THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT AND THE DOMAINS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY DENIS F. SULLIVAN St. John's University Jamaica, New York The most common version of the doctrine of double effect maintains that a distinction should be drawn between two domains of moral responsibility. In the one domain are those effects that an agent brings about as ends or as means to his ends. In the other are those effects that an agent only foresees he will bring about, even if he is certain he will bring them about. The distinction made between these two domains is such that there are certain kinds of effects that could never be justified if they were brought about as means or ends, but that could be justified if they were brought about as foreseen side effects, even if the agent were certain that his action would bring them about. There is another, much weaker version of double effect, which creates a different line of demarcation between the two domains of moral responsibility. In this version there are kinds of effects that could never be justified if they were brought about as ends or means, and that could be justified if brought about as foreseen side effects, but only if the agent was less than certain that his action would bring them about. Here the agent is only justified in taking the risk that he will bring these side effects about. If he is certain that his action will bring such effects about, then they belong in the same moral domain as means. Saint Thomas Aquinas has often been identified as at least the implicit source of the strong version of the doctrine of double 423 424 DENIS F. SULLIVAN effect.1 It is argued that, for Aquinas, intention defines a special domain of moral responsibility. While we are responsible for everything we knowingly bring about, we are responsible in a special way for what we knowingly and intentionally bring about. And it is argued that, for Aquinas, what we intentionally bring about are the ends we pursue and the means we employ-hence the strong version of double effect. Recently, however, Thomas Cavanaugh has argued that Aquinas only accepts the weak version.2 I believe that Cavanaugh is correct, but his argument is less than convincing because he relies on the same use of the concept of intention employed by those who defend the strong version. I shall argue that this use of the concept of intention is mistaken both as an interpretation of Aquinas and as a philosophical position. For Aquinas, I will argue, we intend only the end, not some complex of end and means. Once this is recognized, it will become clear that Aquinas subscribes only to the weak version of double effect, and this in turn will show that, in his thought, intention does not define a special domain ofmoral responsibility in any way that is relevant to the doctrine of double effect. Finally, I will argue that in his analysis of the moral act Aquinas provides us with strong grounds for justifying the position he takes. I In describing Aquinas's position Anthony Kenny writes: "The end is wanted, the means are chosen; what is intended is neither the end itself, nor the means in themselves, but the end through 1 SeeJoseph Boyle, "PraeterIntentionem in Aquinas,"The Thomist42 ~1978): 650. In this paper I will concentrate mainly on the arguments of Boyle since he has done most to defend the strong version of double effect. 2 Thomas Cavanaugh, "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect," The Thomist 61 (1997): 107-21. In a more recent article Cavanaugh has himself rejected the position he ascribes to Aquinas and has argued in favor of the strong version of double effect. See Thomas Cavanaugh, "Double Effect and the Ethical Significance of Distinct Volitional States," Christian Bioethics 3, no. 2 (1997): 134. We shall consider this argument later. DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT 425 the means."3 Cavanaugh tells us that, for Aquinas, "we will the end, we choose the means, we intend the complex end-throughmeans ."4 Joseph Boyle is the most cautious. He admits that, for...