Plantinga on Belief

The Thomist 65 (2001): 593-611 PLANTINGA ON BELIEF jOHNR. T. LAMONT Oxford, England ALVIN PLANTINGA'S Warranted Christian Belief is an important book about an important subject.1 During most of the history of analytic philosophy of religion, discussion about the rational grounds for religious belief, or lack thereof, has been understood as discussion of the grounds for belief in the existence of God. It has been pointed out that most believers, philosophers included, do not hold a simple theism independent of any other religious commitment, but rather accept belief in the existence of God as part of belief in a specific religion like Judaism or Christianity. But analytic philosophers have not concentrated on the nature of rational justification for belief in a religion that claims to be revealed.2 When one of the most eminent analytic philosophers of religion produces a major work on the rational grounding of Christian belief, it is therefore a significant event. Part of the significance comes from the fact that Plantinga is the Christian philosopher who is best known and respected by the secular philosophical world, at least in English-speaking countries . His views are thus liable to be taken as the best rational defense that Christians can offer for their belief. It is therefore 1Alvin Plantings,WarrantedChristianBelief(Oxford: OxofrdUniversityPress, 2000). Pp. xx + 508. ISBN 0-19-513192-4 (cloth), 0-19-513193-2 (paper). Page numbers in the text refer to this book. 2 This is not an exceptionless generalization; the principal exception to it is Richard Swinburne, whose work has had the object of giving good reasons for accepting Christian belief. Nonetheless it is broadly true. 593 594 JOHN R. T. LAMONT important that Christians evaluate whether or not he succeeds in his aim of showing that Christian belief is reasonable. I Plantinga's book builds on his previous two books, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, which examined and criticized current views on knowledge and justification and argued for his own position on these subjects. His object in Warranted Christian Beliefis to use the conclusions of these books to address the question of whether Christian belief is rationally acceptable.3 He distinguishes between two kinds of objections that can be raised to the rationality of Christian belief. The first kind are de facto objections, which assert that some or all Christian beliefs are false. The second are de jure objections, which claim that Christian belief lacks rationality in some way (i.e., that it is unjustified, irrational, or unwarranted). His object in the book is to argue that there are no good de jure objections to the rationality of Christian belief that do not depend on de facto objections. Before embarking on this task he addresses objections to the view that Christian belief is possible. He argues convincingly against the positions of Gordon Kaufman, John Hick, and (on some interpretations) Immanuel Kant, who have claimed that it is impossible to refer to God or make affirmative predications about him, and hence that Christians cannot hold the beliefs that they purport to hold. Having dealt with this preliminary issue, Plantinga asks how the de jure question is to be understood. He first considers the evidentialist view, as found in John Locke. Evidentialism embodies classical foundationalism and deontologism. Classical foundationalism holds that a belief is acceptable for a person if and only if it is either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, or else is believed on the evidential basis of propositions 3 By Christian belief he means what is common to the great creeds of the main branches of the Christian church. PLANTINGA ON BELIEF 595 that are acceptable and support it deductively, inductively, or abductively. Classical deontologism holds that we have a moral duty to regulate our beliefs in this way. A belief is justified if the believer has followed this duty in forming it. The de jure question for the evidentialist will be whether Christian believers follow their duty by proportioning their belief to the evidence available to them. Plantinga rejects this view of the de jure question, because he holds that classical foundationalism can be seen to be false. It is self-refuting...