The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the Truth of Subjectivity

The Thomist 67 (2003): 1-44 THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF THE NATURAL LAW AND THE TRUTH OF SUBJECTIVITY1 MAR.TIN RHONHEIMER Pontifical University ofthe Holy Cross Rome, Italy LA "DUALISTIC FALLACY" AND THE ESSENTIALLY COGNITIVE CHARACTER OF THE NATURAL LAW A) A Historical Reminiscence: The "Nature-Reason" Dichotomy In a book bearing the title Lex naturae, which was published almost half a century ago and became before Vatican Council II an obligatory work of reference, moral theologian Josef Fuchs presented a systematic exposition of the formulations of the Magisteriurn of the Church on the natural moral law.2 He thought that he had found "two series" of formulations. The first series referred to the "ontological foundation" of the natural law, the "nature of things": these formulations identified the natural law with the "corporeal-spiritual nature of man" and thus understood it as nature, which was normative for human action. On the basis of this first approach, the natural law was regarded as a normative order placed within the order of things. On the other hand, the 1 This paper was presented during the VIIIth General Assembly of the Pontifical Academy for Life (Vatican City, February 25/27, 2002) and will be published with the title "La legge morale naturale: conoscenza morale e coscienza" in the Proceedings, edited by the Libreria Editrice Vaticana. 2 J. Fuchs, Natural Law: A Theological Investigation, trans. H. Reckter and J. Dowling (New York, 1965; original German edition published 1955). For more details see M. Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of Moral Autonomy (Fordham University Press, New York, 2000), 8ff. 2 MARTIN RHONHEIMER second series of formulations was said to refer to what Fuchs called "the noetic aspect of the natural law, its being written into the heart, its natural ability to be recognised by man."3 With this schematization, Fuchs echoed an approach that was widespread in the neo-Scholastic theology and philosophy of the period, which without doubt also influenced the language of not a few documents of the Magisterium. According to this approach, the "natural law" is an order of nature that is knowable by man, and, once known, imposes itself immediately as a norm of moral action.4 This schema, in essential terms, is dualistic because it is based upon a dichotomy between "nature" and "natural order" (the objective aspect) on the one hand, and "reason" and "moral knowledge" (the subjective aspect) on the other: the natural law is situated in the sphere of nature; it is the function of reason to read the moral order placed in nature and to follow this order in free action. Only in this sense can one affirm that the natural law "is written in the heart of man": it is an objective, normative natural order that is subjectively known and applied to action. But an observation must be made here: according to this notion what is "written in the heart of man" is not so much the natural law in its objective being as it is the subjective knowledge of this law. The natural law itself is said to be a kind of code of moral norms, found in nature as an "object" of knowledge-though, as "law," independent of this last. This notion is based upon what I would like to call a "dualistic fallacy." In my judgment, it is difficult to match this way of speaking about the natural law with the long tradition of the doctrine on lex naturalis, of which St. Thomas was not only a privileged witness but also perhaps the most lucid and original continuator. For this tradition, the natural law was never simply 3 Fuchs, Natural Law, 6-9. 4 Cf. ibid.: "In these [texts concerned with the ontological aspect] the being, the very essence or nature of man as composed ofbody and spirit appears as a norm of moral behavior and of law ... reason reads the natural law in the nature of all things and particularly in the nature of man." Fuchs's assertion that this schema expresses in a completely general way the opinion of traditional moral theology is certainly not correct. Cf. M. Rhonheimer, Natural Law and Practical Reason, 9ff. THE...