Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique by Louis Roy, O.P., Le sentiment de transcendance, expérience de Dieu? by Louis Roy, O.P. (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 163 nonpersons. The classical notions of person as rational substance and per se existent provide the basis for a general definition, but they do not provide the constitutive differences that particularize persons. Forthis, Albert holds, a special proprietas persona/is is required that bestows the singularity and incommunicability distinguishing the distinct person in his personhood. Here, Hipp argues, Albert is refining the classical Boethian definition by using and extending the notion of singularity introduced by Richard of St. Victor. Albert it thus able to preserve the "rational substance" definition of Boethius while at the same time taking account of the emphasis on incommunicability as an essential element in personhood. Hipp suggests thatAlbert's understanding ofpersonhood has implications for Trinitarian theology by making possible a new understanding of the hypostatic union. The focus on singularity as a differentiating feature of persons implies that Christ's human nature is not individual because it is not per se a person. This allows that the proprietas persona/is of the second person of the Trinity is primarily a characteristic in the union of the two natures. Hipp does not develop this suggestion; nonetheless, it is provocative in its theological potential. While this is clearly an important study, the historical and theological merits of this book are compromised in its execution. It is quite long and ponderous and readslike an unedited draft of a dissertation. It is magisterial in its scope, yet it lacks the unity and accessibility necessary for its recommendation to any but the specialist. It is certainly true that the argument is quite sophisticated and provocative in places, but little effort is made to communicate with the reader. Indeed, the style of presentation is so poor that the reader is frequently at a loss to •mderstand precisely what the author intends. A particular problem is diction which in many places is very bad. One wonders why the author and publisher decided to publish it in its present form. Both the subject and the author's insights deserve a better presentation. Gonzaga University Spokane, Washington MICHAEL W. TKACZ Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique. By LOUIS ROY, 0.P. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. Pp. 215. $60.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-8020-3534-5. Le sentiment de transcendance, experience de Dieu? By LOUIS ROY, O.P. Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 2000. Pp. 136. 95 F (paper).ISBN 2-204-06390-8. In both of these books, Louis Roy studies experiences many people have, namely, transcendent experiences: "an apprehension of the infinite through 164 BOOK REVIEWS feeling, in a particular circumstance" (Transcendent Experiences, 4). He agrees with those who have positive judgments of these experiences, and interprets them "in accord with thinkers who envision the human self as essentially open to the infinite" (xi). Such experiences can be nonillusionary, and indeed the most valuable component of human existence. Roy's books are not theological, but a "contribution to the philosophy of religion" (xiv). Transcendent Experiences has three parts. The first part is phenomenological. Here Roy analyses the major elements of such an experience: the preparation for it, what occasions it, the "feeling" within it (not simply to be identified with emotion), the discovery or objective correlate that the person finds by its help, · the interpretation of it, and its fruits (e.g., conversion). There are different principal types of such transcendent experience that we can distinguish: aesthetic, ontological, ethical, and interpersonal. Roy exemplifies these types by compelling narratives drawn from writers describingtheir own experiences, from the communal use of an African-American religious hymn, and from a novel, and he distinguishes the major elements in each of them. Through these experiences an infinite is somehow manifested. How do philosophers who have positive judgments of such experiences account for them? This is the theme of the second part, which takes up twothirds of the book. Roy draws something positive from Kant's analysis of the experience of the sublime, Schleiermacher's study of the sense of absolute dependence, Hegel's dialectical phenomenology of religion, William James's exposition of religious experiences within the context of his pragmatism, and Otto's explanation ofthe human sense ofthe Holy. But he also shows something lacking...