Thomas on the Order of Love and Desire: A Development of Doctrine

The Thomist 71 (2007): 65-87 THOMAS ON THE ORDER OF LOVE AND DESIRE: A DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY University ofDallas Irving, Texas ONE ENCOUNTERS A DIFFICULTY in reading St. Thomas Aquinas on the relationship between love and desire. Which is prior in the order of generation, love or desire? Whereas Thomas in his mature writings clearly ascribes priority to love, in his early writings he frequently, though not exclusively, ascribes priority to desire. The latter opinion is most discernible in certain texts of his Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. Herein, he is burdened in part by an inaccurate reception of St. Augustine, whom he takes to say, "Love is of what is already possessed." Since love is of what is possessed, it must (in the creature, which begins in a state of imperfection) follow desire, which is for what is not yet possessed. Already in the Scriptum, Thomas's mature teaching begins to appear; nonetheless, he remains indecisive. A trace of this early opinion finds its way into the disputed questions De Veritate. In question 23, article 1, Thomas asks whether God has "will." It is objected that God does not have will, since imperfection is inherent to the will, which, as an appetite, is "of what is not possessed, according to Augustine."1 Thomas responds by distinguishing the sense we give to "appetite ," which is named from the act of tending, from the sense we give to "will," which regards its object indifferently (whether 1 De Veritate, q. 23, a. 1, obj. 8: "Est enim non habiti secundum Augustinum" (Leonine ed., vol. 22.3 [Rome: Editori di san Tommaso, 1976], 652, 11. 64-65). 65 66 CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY possessed or not possessed). Hence, "will" can be predicated of God properly, but "appetite" can be predicated of him only improperly. None of this is surprising. What is noteworthy is the following assertion in the response to the objection: By the same principle [naturam] something is moved to the end which it does not yet have and rests in the end which it has already obtained. Therefore, it belongs to the same power to tend towards the good when it is not had and to love it and delight in it after it is had.2 The reader is left wondering: In an imperfect being, does "tending" precede "loving"? Depending upon how one punctuates the text (and the editions do not agree), the answer Thomas gives here is either an affirmative or a curious silence.3 The affirmative answer, further, makes more difficult an adequate distinction between love and delight. This uncharacteristic formulation has roots in Thomas's earliest attempts to address the order of love and desire. The present essay exhibits Thomas's struggle in the Scriptum to identify the relationship and order between desire and love. The essay also shows Thomas's struggle to distinguish desire, delight, and love clearly and consistently. I. THE MATURE TEACHING: LOVE PRECEDES DESIRE Thomas in his mature writings argues as follows that love precedes desire in the order of generation. Love regards the good simply, whether had or not had, whereas desire regards the good as not had, and delight regards the good as had.4 Love is thus 2 Ibid., ad 8: "per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad terminum quern nondum optinet, et in termino quiescit quern iam optinuit; uncle eiusdem potentiae est tendere in bonum cum nondum habetur et diligere ipsum et delectari in eo postquam habetur" (Leonine ed., 654, II. 281-86). 3 The alternative marks off "diligere ipsum" by commas: "tendere in bonum cum nondum habetur, et diligere ipsum, et delectari in eo postquam habetur" (Robert Busa, ed., S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia, vol. 3 [Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1980], 136b). 4 De Verit., q. 26, a. 4; Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 91; III, c. 26; In De Divinis Nominibus IV, lect. 9, p. 401-2; Summa Theologiae I, q. 20, a. 1; I-II, q. 28, a. 1, ad 1; I-II, q. 67, a. 6; etc. THOMAS ON THE ORDER OF LOVE AND DESIRE 67 more universal than desire or delight. Thomas defines love as a certain appetitive proportion to, or complacency in...