Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics by Douglas B. Rasmussen and Douglas J. Den Uyl (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 637 debate about the place of Aristotle in the interpretation of Aquinas (and vice versa), the perennial importance of Vatican I, and the strengths and weaknesses of la nouvelle theologie. Thomists of vibrantly Aristotelian provenance will find it refreshing (with inevitable partial reservations). In our metaphysically tonedeaf age, the book reopens important discussions on the topic of fundamental theology, and ought to be read by all those seriously interested in the renewal of genuine ontological reflection within Christian theology. Dominican House ofStudies Washington, D.C. THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE, 0.P. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics. By DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN and DOUGLASJ. DENUYL. University Park, Penn.: Penn State Press, 2005. Pp. 358. $25.00 (paper). ISBN 0-271-02701-0. Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl's Norms ofLiberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-Perfectionist Politics provides a seminal contribution to liberal political thought that will be of significant interest to Thomists as well as other classically trained Aristotelians and natural law theorists. The book's argument, although occasionally repetitive, is characterized by uncommon rigor and clarity. It suggests a unique approach to the defense of political liberalism that draws upon Aristotelian virtue ethics. The authors contend that contemporary liberal theorists who embrace conventionalism and relativism do so because they misuse the principle of the primacy of political liberty as the basis for a comprehensive ethical doctrine. Rasmussen and Den Uyl agree with critics of liberalism, such as Alasdair Macintyre, who insist that procedural political theory without a more substantive deep ethical structure is untenable. Contrary to these critics, however , the authors hold that Aristotelian virtue can provide liberalism the defense that it requires. Furthermore, they assert that Aristotelian principles properly applied to the heterogeneity ofmodern life entail a version of political liberalism. Three key premises ground this conclusion: (1) there are many different forms of human excellence and as a consequence excellence is radically individualized, (2) liberty or "self-direction" is an essential constitutive feature of human flourishing, but (3) flourishing is "profoundly social." From these premises the authors infer that the protection of certain natural rights is grounded in "metanormative" political principles, rather than ethical norms. Governments and political communities should neither coerce nor encourage the pursuit of human excellence, since doing so would be contrary to the requirements of selfdirection . The problem of constructing a political system that permits the pursuit of diverse forms of flourishing that do not conflict with each other the authors call "liberalism's problem." 638 BOOK REVIEWS Aristotelians and Thomists will find the book's central arguments agreeable in some respects and problematic in others. On the one hand, Rasmussen and Den Uy! grant that the natural right to political liberty must be grounded in an ethical account of the human good. They also endorse metaphysical realism and maintain that human nature has objective significance for ethics. They place principled as opposed to merely pragmatic limits upon the role ofstate authority, a point they rightly insist is found in Aquinas's distinction between moral and legal obligations. On the other hand, they propose a form of radical individualism that appears deficient as an account of human nature and the moral preconditions for the exercise of liberty in a free society. While some Aristotelian critics of liberalism fall into the utopian tendency of yearning for the homogeneity of the ancient polis, the authors' rejection of concrete political norms besides liberty tends to the opposite extreme. They draw a sharp dichotomy between private morality and political authority. This diminishes the significance of intermediate social and political institutions, such as the Church, which can shield individual liberty from the absolute power of the state and foster the common good. To their credit, Rasmussen and Den Uy! are not unaware of these types of criticisms oftheir position and treat them thoughtfully and extensively. The key to the book's unique defense of liberalism, and a principal strength, is the distinction that is made between certain necessary and unnecessary features of the theory. The authors accept that contemporary liberalism is in crisis for the very reasons stipulated by many of its critics, but they maintain its fundamental soundness as a political...