The Moral Status of the First Principle of Practical Reason in Thomas’s Natural-Law Theory

The Thomist 71 (2007): 609-31 THE MORAL STATUS OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON IN THOMAS'S NATURAL-LAW THEORY GIUSEPPE BUTERA Providence College Providence, Rhode Island IN QUESTION 94, ARTICLE 2 of the Prima Secundae, Thomas Aquinas gives the following well-known formulation of the first principle of practical reason: "Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum" ("Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided").1 Though apparently to the point, this statement is anything but straightforward. The crux of the problem is what exactly Thomas means by bonum and malum. Does he mean "moral good" and "moral evil," or does he mean something more generic, "good" and "evil" taken in their widest sense? If he means the former, then the first principle of practical reason amounts to a moral imperative, a command to do and pursue morally good things and to avoid morally bad things; if the latter, then it means something else.2 1 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminister, Md.: Christian Classics, 1981). All quotations of the Summa are from this edition. 2 One possible alternative, championed by the so-called new natural-law theorists, is that the first principle of practical reason is a prescriptive principle of practical rationality having nothing to do with morality so that practical rationality in itselfis neutral with respect to ends. "[T]he first principle of practical reason hardly can be understood in the first instance as an imperative. As we have seen, it is a self-evident principle in which reason prescribes the first condition of its own practical office" (Germain G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 [1965]: 182). "Aquinas, Grisez argues, did not propose his first principle of practical reason as a moral imperative. Rather,Aquinas supposed thatsuch a principle controls 609 610 GIUSEPPE BUTERA The main purpose of this article will be to argue that bonum and ma/um should be taken in their moral sense. For lack of a better term, this view will be referred to as the imperativist interpretation. The first section will be used to touch upon an important criticism. Viewed against the backdrop of this criticism, it will be easier to see the essential features of the imperativist interpretation. In order to provide the philosophical setting for Thomas's discussion of the first principle of practical reason, the second section will be devoted to providing a general overview of the teaching found in the body of question 94, article 2. In the third section, an argument in favor of the imperativist interpretation will be presented. The last section will be taken up with a defense of the imperativist interpretation against the criticism laid out in the first section. At stake in the dispute between the imperativist interpretation and its critics is more than the moral status of the first principle all coherent practical thinking-whether morally good or evil. 'Good,' as Grisez understands Aquinas's formulation, refers not only to what is morally good, but to whatever within human power can be understood as intelligibly worthwhile; 'evil' refers to any privation ofintelligible goods. Interpreted in this way, the principle neither presupposes a knowledge of right and wrong nor, a fortiori, enjoins us to choose the morally upright course of action. The work done by the first principle is more primitive. It states a condition of any coherent practical thinking, viz., that one's reasoning be directed toward some end that is pursuable by human action. Even morally wicked choices, to the extent that they are intelligible, meet this condition (although, as we shall see not so well as morally upright choices). Consider, for example, a choice that treats another person unfairly. To the extent that such a choice has an intelligible point, it will be consistent with the first principle of practical reason, despite its immorality. Understood as a directive, the first principle is weak: It requires only coherence, not full moral rectitude" (Robert P. George, In Defense ofNatural Law [New York: Oxford...