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BOOK REVIEWS 138 that is, physically direct. But that alone is still not a morally relevant viewpoint” (394, emphasis in original). Rhonheimer claims to find support for this position in Thomas. “[O]bjects of human acts,” he says, “are not ‘things’ (as in res aliena, ‘a thing which belongs to another person’), but the whole so-called exterior act (e.g., subtrahere rem alienam, ‘taking away something which belongs to another person’)” (152). Thomas does employ such expressions as subtrahere rem alienam when referring to the object of the human act of stealing (see, e.g., De Malo, q. 2, a. 4, ad 5; STh I-II, q. 18, a. 2; q. 18, a. 5, ad 2) but he is not at all reluctant to refer to the object simply as a thing (res). In question 18, article 2 of the Prima Secundae, for instance, in his reply to the first objection, he speaks of the objects of certain bad human actions as res exteriores; and in question 2 of De Malo (a. 7, ad 8) he says quite plainly that “a thing belonging to another (res aliena) is the proper object of a theft, giving it its species.” The relationship between “taking away something which belongs to another” and “thing which belongs to another” is precisely the relationship we saw above between the description of a heavy-body-in-motion’s object as “to be in a lower place” and as “a lower place” (STh I-II, q. 1, a. 8). The former expressions—subtrahere rem alienam and esse in loco inferiori—indicate also the context within which the objects are objects. No one engaged in the debate about Thomas’s action theory denies that the objects of human acts must be understood within their proper and practical context (“from the perspective of the active person”): an object is a finis quo. But, supposing that the action is one that has as its object a physical thing and not something nonphysical such as a way of thinking (that I, let us say, am seeking to change), that object is the same physical object that exists in the external world as a res exterior. As I suggested above, this book is well worth reading—or better, it is well worth studying. In doing so one will learn a great deal, for Rhonheimer has read extensively in both the primary and the secondary literature. But one should also remain circumspect. Key arguments are tendentious, and the direction in which they tend is, in my opinion, the wrong one. KEVIN FLANNERY Gregorian University Rome, Italy Market Complicity and Christian Ethics. By ALBINO BARRERA Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Pp. 324. $88.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1107 -00315-6. By his previous writing Barrera has established himself as one of the important voices in theological ethical reflection upon economic life. In addition to his productivity—this is his fifth book—there is the quality of his writing: lucid BOOK REVIEWS 139 prose, well-plotted presentation, balanced judgment, and courtesy in treatment of others’ work. All of these qualities are on display once again in this most recent book. Readers of Barrera’s earlier work know that he is adept at interdisciplinary work, bringing economics and theological ethics into fruitful dialogue. With this volume he brings a third scholarly discipline into the conversation: legal philosophy, particularly tort theory. He does not simply resort to this new area of study in a few passing references, but integrates it fully into a sustained argument about moral liability for harms, intended and unintended. The book is composed of ten chapters constituting three parts. The subject matter is a probing inquiry into three questions: Why may we be held morally responsible for incidental harms brought about through free market activities? How can we determine when cooperation in bringing about harms is permissible or blameworthy? And what is the degree of liability that can be assessed in order to bring about a lessening of the harms? In an introduction that could serve as a model for what an author should do at the outset of a book, Barrera presents his subject and then explains how he will proceed to...

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