Abstract

Abstract:

Philosophers of science have recently debated whether second-order uncertainty in climate change forecasts demonstrates the applicability of the argument from inductive risk (AIR) to this case. This paper defends a generalized, normative, and structural interpretation of AIR to address challenges raised in this literature. The interpretation of AIR proposed is generalized by including the possibility that scientists may suspend judgment rather than accept or reject a hypothesis. In addition, it distinguishes between descriptive and normative versions of AIR, and provides reasons for preferring the latter. Finally, it emphasizes advantages of applying AIR at a structural rather than individual level.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1530-9274
Print ISSN
1063-6145
Pages
pp. 696-721
Launched on MUSE
2016-11-06
Open Access
No
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