Bringing Order Out of Chaos: Russia’s Aspirations to Greatness

Realists argue that Russian foreign policy is not sui generis—the Kremlin pursues balance-of-power politics, reacting to threats and opportunities as any great power would under similar circumstances. Constructivists focus on the role of domestic factors and questions of national identity—they see Russia as unique, with national interests derived from Russia’s specific historical experiences and cultural characteristics.

Bobo Lo’s comprehensive study, Russia and the New World Disorder, draws on both perspectives. This method is appropriate since Russian leaders—from Vladimir Putin on down—emphasize Russia’s historical and cultural uniqueness, distinct from both Europe and Asia, while adhering to a classic European concept of great-power politics in which Russia deserves a privileged seat at the international table. Russia’s idea of equality and democracy in world politics extends only to the great powers, as Lo observes (pp. 65–67). Smaller and medium powers merit little attention. Moscow also remains fixated on traditional security threats, slighting issues such as global warming or infectious disease.

For Lo, the domestic context is critical to understanding Russian foreign policy. He argues that Russia’s authoritarian system has less impact on its foreign relations than do structural factors, namely, geography and history. Russian leaders seem to agree. In a recent article, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov emphasized the historical dimension in his country’s foreign policy, asserting that Russia has always been a political outsider on the margins of Europe.¹ In a speech justifying the annexation of Crimea, President Vladimir Putin stressed Russia’s historical links with the peninsula. He also rejected Europe’s centuries-long efforts to contain Russia by “constantly trying to sweep us into a corner.”² Insecurity is a constant in Russia’s external relations. Reflecting a classic security dilemma, Moscow’s preoccupation with military power and aggressive behavior generates fear and insecurity in other states, a process that Russian leaders either cannot or will not understand. NATO expansion may have been driven by Washington’s goal of consolidating its position in post–Cold War Europe, but Russia’s smaller neighbors welcomed the NATO security umbrella as insurance against a revanchist Moscow.

Lo does not take sides in the debate over who is responsible for NATO expansion and the current tensions in Europe, though his characterization of Russia as a postmodern empire tends to align him with Moscow’s critics. Russians view international politics as a zero-sum game, with great powers competing for influence among smaller powers, and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics are viewed through this prism. Thus, NATO’s enlargement is framed as a challenge to Russia’s hegemony instead of a rational response by weaker states to perceived threats from Russia.

In recent years, neo-Eurasianism has become an important strain of Russian political thought that emphasizes its national uniqueness and has moved from the fringes of discourse toward the center. Putin appears to buy into the perspectives of prominent Eurasianists such as Alexander Dugin, who draws on Halford Mackinder’s notion of geopolitics as a struggle between sea powers and land powers. In the 21st century, this school of thought positions Russia and China as the leading land powers (and of course Russia rules the heartland), gradually displacing the United States and Great Britain for global prominence. Layered onto this view is the civilizational idea that Russia is not only distinct from but culturally and morally superior to a decadent West, with the civilizational divides outlined by Samuel Huntington becoming more salient than nation-state boundaries. Russia, then, is both a nation-state and a civilizational core.

The 21st century is a challenge for the richest countries and most adroit leaders, yet, as Bobo Lo argues, Putin and his supporters are operating under a 19th-century view of the world that thinks in terms of balance of (hard) power, zero-sum competition, and spheres of influence (pp. 73–81, 98–99). Lip service is paid to economic strength, yet the Kremlin has avoided making the painful reforms that would modernize the country and reduce overdependence on hydrocarbons. Moreover...