In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

  • India and China at Sea:A Contest of Status and Legitimacy in the Indian Ocean
  • David Brewster (bio)

Strategic competition between India and China in the Indian Ocean has the potential to profoundly affect the stability and security of the region. This essay examines Indian and Chinese views on the status and legitimacy of their roles in the Indian Ocean and argues that fundamental differences in perceptions could exacerbate an already highly competitive security dynamic in the maritime domain. New Delhi tends to have a somewhat proprietary attitude toward the region, questioning the legitimacy of any extraregional naval presence, particularly China. But Indian strategists also see China as having strategic vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean. For its part, Beijing refuses to recognize India’s claims to great-power status or special prerogatives in the Indian Ocean region (IOR).

This essay first summarizes China’s growing strategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean. It then considers India’s aspirations to take a leading role in the IOR and Indian perspectives on China’s presence in the region. Next, the essay discusses Chinese perspectives on India and its role in the Indian Ocean and considers the potential consequences for China of the failure to take India’s sensitivities into account. In short, I argue that China’s failure to try to co-opt India as a partner or address some of its concerns is a mistake. Beijing will find it difficult to create a favorable geostrategic environment in the Indian Ocean in opposition to India.

China’s Imperatives in the Indian Ocean

China’s primary strategic imperative in the IOR is the protection of its sea lines of communication (SLOC) across the Indian Ocean. Beijing is keenly aware that its SLOCs are highly vulnerable to threats from state and nonstate actors, especially at the narrow chokepoints through which most trade must pass. Chinese strategists are concerned that an adversary may use these vulnerabilities as a bargaining chip in the context of a wider dispute. China also has other developing interests in the IOR, including a growing population of Chinese nationals and greater [End Page 4] investment in the region. These issues are likely to become increasingly important in the country’s strategic thinking.

An additional factor is that China’s military expansion program will significantly enhance its ability to project military power into the IOR in the long term. Its capabilities already exceed India’s by a considerable and growing margin. China’s naval presence has grown in connection with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s antipiracy deployments in the western Indian Ocean, which Beijing is now making more permanent, including by developing logistical support facilities in Djibouti. China’s One Belt, One Road initiative will also involve the development of a swathe of maritime infrastructure across the IOR.

India’s Aspirations in the Indian Ocean

India considers itself as the leading Indian Ocean state and as destined to be the natural leader of the region. It thus takes a somewhat proprietorial attitude toward the IOR and perceives the presence of extraregional naval powers, particularly China, as essentially illegitimate.

India has long harbored ambitions to become the dominant power in the Indian Ocean. Though few Indian officials might care to publicly admit it, many in New Delhi see the Indian Ocean as more or less “India’s ocean.”1 As Donald Berlin has commented, “New Delhi regards the Indian Ocean as its backyard and deems it both natural and desirable that India function as, eventually, the leader and the predominant influence in this region—the world’s only region and ocean named after a single state.”2

India’s views on the Indian Ocean are partly defensive: the country’s colonial experience is used to justify the exclusion of extraregional powers from the Indian Ocean, an approach that is sometimes labeled “India’s Monroe Doctrine.” The idea involves an assertion, at least unofficially, that the military presence of outside powers in India’s neighborhood is essentially illegitimate and that neighboring countries should rely exclusively on India as the predominant regional manager and security provider.3 If this is not actually a policy, then it is at least a preferred objective. It...

pdf

Share