Abstract

This paper presents Leibniz and Des Bosses’s views on extension and the corporeal substance. It presents Des Bosses’s philosophical project as a way of shedding light on the well-known correspondence between the two and uses a previously unexplored text: Des Bosses’s outline of a metaphysical treatise of his own. The paper argues that Leibniz introduced the notion of a substantial bond, at the demand of Des Bosses, in order to secure the reality of extension; that Des Bosses had strong views on matter and extension, which could not be satisfied by Leibniz’s proposal; that these views led him to reject Leibniz’s notion of the substantial bond; consequently, that Leibniz’s notion of corporeal substance was incompatible with the views on matter and extension defended by Des Bosses; and, finally, that Des Bosses developed his metaphysical ideas in 1735 by using Leibnizian insights for his agenda.

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