Abstract

Abstract:

Seventeenth-century atomist David Gorlaeus rejects Aristotelian forms and real universals in things while accepting components of Aristotelian accounts of knowledge including sensible species, the immateriality of the intellect and key features of realist theories of universals. To resolve two puzzles raised by his theory of knowledge I interpret Gorlaeus’ claims about universals in light of a contemporaneous Aristotelian view. Whether the puzzles are adequately resolved or not, they create a problem space within which figures like Descartes and Locke developed their views on the role of universals in scientific knowledge.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1530-9274
Print ISSN
1063-6145
Pages
pp. 285-304
Launched on MUSE
2016-05-18
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.