Grand Bargain or Bad Idea?: U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan

To the Editors (Leif-Eric Easley writes):

In “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain?” Charles Glaser identifies a mismatch between Chinese security goals and the status quo in Asia.¹ Concerned that the probability of war will increase with divergence between the distribution of power and benefits under the existing regional order, Glaser proposes accommodating China in areas “that do not compromise vital U.S. interests” (p. 50). He recommends a “grand bargain” wherein the United States abandons Taiwan in exchange for China’s peaceful resolution of maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas and acceptance of an enduring U.S. military presence in East Asia.

Glaser’s motivation—to avoid U.S.-China conflict—is laudable, and his article is a detailed assault on policy orthodoxy. Yet, it is essentially a policy recommendation framed as a desirability study, which ultimately does not demonstrate desirability or feasibility. Below I present three sets of objections regarding the article’s one-sided account of the accommodation literature, its incomplete cost-benefit assessment of abandoning Taiwan, and its selective exclusion of norms and values integral to U.S. strategy in Asia.

Appeasement not preferred in theory or practice

Glaser contrasts his defensive realist approach with structural realism and offensive realism, which he says predict that U.S.-China relations will resemble those between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, with nuclear weapons keeping the peace but with insecurity increasing as China attempts to claim regional hegemony. He does not assess competing structural and offensive realist explanations, however.² And without convincing evidence that Chinese aims are limited and nationalism is under control, it is unclear why a defensive realist approach should be assumed rather than tested.

Glaser argues that an established power can enhance its security by pursuing territorial accommodation toward a rising power. He cites international relations theorists who lament that concessions-granting strategies suffer a stigma in foreign policy circles.³ The literature suggests, however, that appeasement usually fails, and even in the handful of historical circumstances in which it may have succeeded, its benefits tended not to last.⁴ Efforts to model strategies of accommodation suggest that a declining power may instead have incentives to hold the line early against a rising challenger to preempt its use of salami tactics and avoid engaging in a future conflict under less favorable conditions.⁵ Glaser offers almost no coverage of the most studied case of failed territorial accommodation vis-à-vis Germany, nor does he provide historical examples where accommodation succeeded.

Applications of bargaining theory are generally unsupportive of appeasement, stressing incentives that governments have to misrepresent their intentions.⁶ An accommodation strategy might make sense for a weak power with reliable intelligence that its adversary has limited aims or for a relatively matched power that seeks to buy time for rearmament.⁷ These conditions do not apply to the U.S.-China case, however. The United States lacks reliable intelligence on China’s limited aims, but it is not a weak power and it has no need to abandon Taiwan for the sake of improving its military capabilities. Glaser suggests that the United States seek accommodation before Beijing amasses greater power, but China’s economic growth is slowing; corruption and skills gaps plague its military; and the Communist Party faces crises of social stability, governance and legitimacy over economic inequality, land use, public safety, and environmental pollution. The theoretical need to accommodate China is thus not established.

Mis-assessment of costs and benefits

Glaser nonetheless sees benefits in accommodating China on Taiwan. He opines that current Taiwan policy could precipitate a U.S.-China cold war, even though the United States has much greater economic interdependence with China than it did with the Soviet Union and even though China is more globalized today than the Soviet Union ever was. He worries that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan will fuel an arms race, even though China is currently the only one racing.⁸ Glaser identifies...