Rescuing the “Loss-Of-Agency” Account of Thought Insertion

According to an influential view, a thought is pathologically ‘inserted’ when it is not voluntarily caused by the subject, that is, when the subject has not formed it qua agent. Recently, Lisa Bortolotti found this account unsatisfactory: most of our ordinary thoughts are not voluntarily produced by us, and yet they are not regarded as ‘inserted,’ so the cause of thought insertion cannot be a loss of agency. Thus, Bortolotti elaborates an alternative view according to which thought insertion is owing to a failure to ‘endorse’ the thought on the part of the subject. Although I agree with Bortolotti that the Endorsement Model is preferable to the Traditional ‘Loss-of-Agency’ Account of thought insertion, I argue that agency is systematically connected with non-pathological thinking, although not ordinarily in the form of the volitional agentive capacity to produce thoughts intentionally, and that in thought insertion such connection between thinking and agency is lost.