Julius Bahnsen’s Influence on Nietzsche’s Wills-Theory

This article traces the development of Nietzsche’s early adoption and later rejection of Schopenhauer’s theory of Will. I argue that Nietzsche’s break with Schopenhauer was coextensive with his acceptance of explanatory naturalism about both external and internal activities. I argue further that a major source for four of his specific arguments against the Schopenhauerian primacy of the one Will was the little-known neo-Schopenhauerian thinker Julius Bahnsen. Using Bahnsen, Nietzsche argues (1) that there is no empirical evidence of a transcendent Will; (2) that explanations of behavior do not require a transcendent Will; (3) that what explains behavior is not a “thing” at all, but a fluid dynamic of strivings; and (4) that these strivings are “guided” even absent a distinct guiding principle.