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  • Modellfall für Deutschland? Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945–1955 by Michael Gehler
  • Ursula Beitter
Modellfall für Deutschland? Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945–1955. By Michael Gehler. Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2015. Pp. 1382. Cloth €129.00. 978-3706540629.

Those familiar with Michael Gehler’s research know that his scholarship on international relations is thorough and substantial. His latest publication—a 1247-page monograph entitled Model for Germany?—is no exception. The book builds on the scholarship of Gerald Stourzh (Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 1985), Rolf Steininger (Der Staatsvertrag, 2005), and Matthias Pape (Ungleiche Brüder, 2000), among others. Gehler revisits the debate of whether Germany could have followed Austria’s lead in terms of becoming neutral and maintaining its territorial integrity. Could Austria and Germany have been models for each other? In what ways were the two countries reciprocally dependent on one another? Which powers considered, pursued, or refuted German neutrality? Gehler’s detailed work seeks to fill a lacuna in previous scholarship concerning these questions. The book’s main value lies in the presentation of documents that scholars have not sufficiently considered hitherto when discussing the possibility of the Austrian neutrality scenario for Germany.

Gehler’s meticulous research illuminates issues from different perspectives, taking into account newspapers, meetings, letters, memoirs, and previously classified materials. Its additional value resides in its suspenseful narrative: on one level it revisits and elaborates on the well-documented divergent paths of Germany and Austria during the Cold War. On another it provides a second storyline in the form of extensive references and citations, allowing dramatic insights into behind-the-scenes diplomatic machinations. Gehler and his sources aptly refer to the power struggle between the Allies as a high-stakes poker game (655, 984), as a chess game (596, 614), and as a puppet show, with Austria, West Germany, and on occasion the GDR serving as the [End Page 199] pawns or marionettes (262). The four powers engaged in maneuvers to maintain control over Germany’s postwar development while, at the same time, guarding their own interests. In this context, Austria’s and Germany’s efforts to determine their identity and have autonomy over their respective destinies make a fascinating read.

Gehler traces Austria’s strategy for attaining neutrality between 1945 and 1955 through the positions and opinions of diplomats, ministers, secret-service agents, and journalists. He also cites from the exchange of diplomatic notes between the embassies of the Allies, Austria, and Germany to shed more light on Austria’s well-orchestrated plan to separate from Germany’s sphere of influence, achieve neutrality, and arrange withdrawal of occupation forces. As early as June 1945, the State Department summarized its goals for Austria as follows: to establish a four-power military regime for Austria, to sever all Austrian connection to Germany, and “to eradicate all German influence in Austria” (30). Austria, too, was determined to be neutral and sever its ties to Germany. Gehler suggests that, from the beginning, Austrian chancellors, ministers, and diplomats exercised patience, tact, and even humility in pursuit of these various goals.

The two countries continued to experience tension over the question of German property in Austria and a lingering fear of a new “cultural” annexation to Germany. Gehler attributes the fact that Austria ultimately reached its goals to the skill of Austrian diplomats, its long-range diplomacy, Soviet support, and a shift in the balance of power during the Cold War. The contrast between Austrian and German diplomatic maneuvers is striking, leading to a different trajectory for Germany: longer occupation, Western integration, rearmament, and, ultimately, a divided Germany. Germany’s fate was determined on the one hand by the Allies and Cold War power plays: the Soviets were vehemently opposed to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris. On the other hand, Konrad Adenauer was committed to Western integration. To him a neutral Germany—albeit united—was anathema.

Gehler bares the behind-the-scenes workings, suspicions, and phobias of all parties involved in solving the so-called German question and documents deliberations about using an Austrian model for Germany. The Soviets, in exchange for German neutrality, offered to agree to unification...

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