Looking for Asia’s Security Dilemma

To the Editors (Ronan Tse-min Fu writes):

In “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” Adam Liff and John Ikenberry claim that “a number of recent developments suggest that the region is ripe for, or may already be experiencing, severe security dilemma–driven dynamics, even arms races.”¹ They portray China’s rise as the main cause of this dilemma and assert that states must adopt measures to reduce military competition in the region while they still can.

I applaud Liff and Ikenberry for the policy relevance of their research, but their fundamental claim about the prevalence of severe military competition in the Asia Pacific region does not match the empirical reality. The real puzzle is why over the last thirty years Asian countries have shown a surprising lack of interest in boosting their military expenditures in response to China’s massive increases, whether these expenditures are measured in absolute or proportional terms, and whether they are measured over the past generation or the last few years.

Is there “severe military competition” in the asia pacific?

Liff and Ikenberry ground their analysis in the empirical observation that Asia might already be engaged in severe military competition, but they never define what they mean by “military competition” (pp. 65–82). They imply that such competition exists when parties seek to enhance their military capabilities in response to an external threat (p. 65). More specifically, they state that “there is evidence of a security dilemma–driven spiral gradually unfolding between China and several states that is driving investments in military capabilities and that may worsen significantly in the years ahead” (p. 88).

If Liff and Ikenberry’s claim that the Asia Pacific is currently experiencing severe military competition were true, then major countries in the region should have significantly boosted their military spending over the past few decades.² After all, China increased its military spending by 576 percent in real terms from 1992 to 2013. And as Liff and Ikenberry note, “the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] increasingly poses at least a potential threat to China’s neighbors and the United States” (p. 67). A generation of Asian leaders, however, has chosen not to respond with similar arms increases. Measured in constant $2011, from 1992 to 2013 Japan’s increase was only 13 percent; South Korea’s increase was 96 percent; and India’s was 192 percent.³

Measured as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP), the military expenditures of most Asia Pacific countries have steadily declined since the Cold War, despite the emergence of the PLA as a professional and capable fighting force.⁴ Few countries in the region have been willing to make massive investments in military power at the expense of other priorities.⁵ In addition, as a proportion of GDP, Asian military spending in 2013 was the lowest it had been since the end of the Cold War. On average, major Asian countries spent 3.32 and 2.83 percentage of their GDP on defense in 1988 and 1992, respectively. In 2013 the average proportion of GDP that major Asian countries devoted to defense was only 1.88 percent.⁶ In this sense, contrary to Liff and Ikenberry’s claim, military competition in the Asia Pacific is becoming less rather than more intense.

Perhaps one could argue that twenty-five years is too long an analytical time frame—that China’s neighbors only recently decided its growth was a threat and have begun to respond. The most recent data do not support this claim either. Measured in inflation-adjusted constant terms, the military spending of key countries in the region declined in 2013: Japan −0.23 percent, India −0.74 percent, Taiwan −2.63 percent, and Australia −3.58 percent.⁷ This is not to suggest that Asian countries are indifferent to China’s assertiveness. Asian countries, especially those with territorial (or other) claims, certainly care about China’s policy in the South...