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  • Little “Red Scares”: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the United States, 1921–1946 ed. by Robert Justin Goldstein
  • Giuliana Chamedes
Robert Justin Goldstein, ed., Little “Red Scares”: Anti-Communism and Political Repression in the United States, 1921–1946 (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate 2014)

Little “Red Scares is an important contribution to the literature on American anticommunism. It gathers together thirteen experts in the field, and sheds light on a period in the history of American anticommunism that has received relatively little historiographical attention: the years between 1921 and 1946. The volume is edited by a pioneer in the field, Robert Justin Goldstein. As Goldstein makes clear in his succinct introduction, this volume proves that the first Red Scare of 1919–1920 was not a blip in American history: rather, it was the opening salvo for decades of anti-communist, counter-subversive activity. Within this framework, McCarthyism was nothing new under the sun. Further, Little “Red Scares” explores the many faces of counter-subversion between 1921 and 1946. Anticommunism was implemented at the federal, state, and municipal levels, often to varying degrees and at different times. The book shows that the boom in activism was a grassroots matter, too. Militant religious and secular organizations were rabidly anticommunist and remarkably well-organized, and often bundled their attacks on communism within broader battles against the rise of secularism, the influx of immigrants, or racial and gender equality. [End Page 256]

The thirteen chapters in the volume are organized chronologically and thematically. They all, to varying degrees, engage with four overarching questions: (1) What is the relationship between the first “great” Red Scare and the second one (1946–1954)? Is this a story of continuity or change over time?; (2) Assuming that anticommunism remained a central force throughout the period under analysis, who led the pack? Should we focus our attention on Congress, the federal government, state governments, local governments, private-sector groups, business interests, labour groups, mainstream media, or religious organizations?; (3) What were the key arguments used against communism, and to what extent did these arguments resonate with broad sectors of the population?; and (4) Did counter-subversive activities successfully curb the spread of communist and left-wing radicalism in the United States between the two world wars?

The arguments offered in answer to these questions vary from chapter to chapter: there is no unified approach or overarching consensus, and rarely do authors directly engage (and disagree with) one another. For instance, the first two chapters provide a new framework for understanding the place of the 1920s in US history, but the similarities end there. In Chapter 1, University of Tennessee historian Ernest Freeberg argues that the receding of the first “great” Red Scare was the work of the emergent civil liberties movement. For Freeberg, the movement initially coalesced around causes such as the continued imprisonment of hundreds of war dissenters after World War I. (Among the 1,200 dissenters convicted during the war was Socialist Party leader Eugene V. Debs who, in 1920, ran for president from behind bars.) Imprisonment without due process led a large number of Americans – including chastened liberals and progressives – to hold high the banner of free speech, and begin fighting for checks on federal and state power. Thus, for Freeberg, anticommunist activism faltered because it was shown to be biased and undemocratic by a large swath of Americans.

Freeberg’s interpretation stands in sharp contrast to that advanced by other scholars in the volume, including Marquette University emeritus historian Athan Theoharis. In his investigation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Theoharis argues that anticommunist activity was never really scaled back after the first Red Scare. Rather, the FBI continued monitoring suspected communists. In the process, the Bureau “evolved from a minor agency having limited influence to a powerful agency that profoundly, if at times indirectly, affected national policy and political culture.” (23) Furthermore, the FBI “won,” in the sense that for fear of being discovered, radical leftists hid in the shadows. In his contribution, the path-breaking expert in this field M.J. Heale comes down somewhere between Freeberg and Theoharis. He argues that there was a huge shift in the...

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