Jubal Early: Robert E. Lee’s “Bad Old Man” by Benjamin Franklin Cooling III (review)

To augment the few existing monographs on Confederate general Jubal A. Early, Benjamin Franklin Cooling III, professor of national security studies at National Defense University, offers “a critical, focused analysis” rather than a complete biography (xiii). In a popular style peppered with questions and answers, Cooling concentrates on Early’s Civil War military career, which vacillated between skillful aggressiveness and irresolution, particularly at Gettysburg, Fort Stevens, and Cedar Creek, as well as his weaknesses in reconnaissance and use of cavalry. This narrow exploration yields a persuasive account of how a strong record dissolved into disgrace by the autumn of 1864, provoking a prolonged post-bellum debate over Early’s merit by contemporaries and historians alike.

To provide context for his Civil War performance, Cooling begins with Early’s childhood, West Point years, and early military career. Cooling believes Early’s first military experiences fashioned him more the citizen-soldier than the professional, as he abandoned the service for civilian law after a brief stint in Florida and only returned to arms when “patriotic submission,” to use Gary W. Gallagher’s term, called him to the Mexican-American War (5). While Early showed initiative and pluck, the war’s most lasting effect was to cripple him with lifelong arthritis. The author makes relatively little of Early’s Whiggish politics and reluctant secession, submitting to Gallagher’s analysis of the topic.

In a chapter entitled “Proving Himself,” Cooling traces Early’s sluggish rise from First Manassas to Chancellorsville, attaining a mere two-star rank by April 1863. Nevertheless, Cooling generally assesses Early’s performance as brigade and division commander as “intrepid” at “crucial moments,” such as when he reversed a breakthrough of Stonewall Jackson’s lines at Fredericksburg; however, when detached at Chancellorsville to guard the heights of Fredericksburg, Early stumbled (27). Confused orders from Lee’s headquarters led to a premature withdrawal on May 1, but when defending the line from the Rappahannock River to Deep Run, Early failed to anticipate the site of the Federal attack and squandered precious time. Spread along three miles, his defense collapsed under John Sedgwick’s superior forces, resulting in a sound Confederate defeat. Thus, Early’s elevation in command met with immediate snags.

From Gettysburg to the Overland campaign, Early revealed more weaknesses, particularly a penchant for hesitation. Even so, Lee increasingly entrusted Early with leadership opportunities, granting him temporary corps command when A. P. Hill and Richard Ewell ailed. In his analysis Cooling does not cave to postwar finger-pointing, particularly regarding the July 1 delays at Gettysburg, for which James Longstreet blamed Early and his superior, Ewell. Rather, Cooling evenhandedly weighs Lee’s vague orders, weary troops, high casualties, and the numerous Federal prisoners waiting to be processed as valid reasons for postponement. Early’s first truly independent command, in December 1863 in the Shenandoah Valley, portended trials to come for his more famous Valley foray the following year. As would become typical, Early blamed his marginal performance and loss of precious supplies on the Confederate cavalry.

The book’s climax, or Early’s moment of truth, came with his famed 1864 Washington campaign (51). Though Early successfully shelled the city, Cooling characterizes the general’s failure to attack Washington in the afternoon and evening of July 11, 1864, as Early “at his weakest” (91). On the three subsequent Confederate defeats—at Third Winchester, Fisher’s Hill, and Cedar Creek—which together sealed the loss of the Valley, Cooling is more comprehensive than many of his scholarly predecessors, such as historian Jeffery Wert. Not only did Early fail to recognize Philip Sheridan’s proficiency, argues Cooling, but Early dismissed his cavalry’s value and overestimated his infantry’s resilience. Equally problematic was the attrition of reliable Confederate officers.

While Cooling’s tour of Early’s military service is brisk and engaging, he often acquiesces to the analysis of...