Canada between Vichy and Free France, 1940–1945 by Olivier Courteaux (review)

Olivier Courteaux opens his book with Charles de Gaulle’s momentous “Vive le Québec Libre” comment of 1967, which is famous to Canadians for the effect it had on French–English relations in Canada. Courteaux uses this incident to introduce readers to the key theme of his book: Canadian unity. The divide between the French-Canadian and English-Canadian populations was wide at the outbreak of the Second World War, as the country was still recovering from the conscription crisis of 1917. For Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, therefore, the creation of Vichy France proved to be a thorny issue that, if handled incorrectly, had the potential to divide the nation once again. This is why Canada was caught between Vichy and Free France.

According to Courteaux, Mackenzie King’s policy regarding France rested on three pillars. The first was to “carefully weigh the views of the French-Canadian electorate.” It was clear that Canada, and indeed all nations, would ultimately be forced to choose between Vichy France under Philippe Pétain and Free France under Charles de Gaulle. Further complicating this choice for the Canadian prime minister were the increasingly divergent views of the leaders of Canada’s two senior partners, Great Britain and the United States. As a relative unknown, Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the Free French, was not enthusiastically endorsed as the French heir apparent by either Prime Minister Churchill or President Roosevelt. However, by 1942 Churchill reluctantly began to agree that de Gaulle was the only logical choice. Roosevelt remained unconvinced. Therefore, Courteaux makes the argument that Canada was caught not only between Vichy and Free France but also between Churchill and Roosevelt, both of whom sought Canadian support for their incompatible policies regarding France.

As Courteaux explores Mackenzie King’s conundrum, he skilfully illustrates the effect that this foreign-affairs issue had on domestic policy. At every turn, the reader can see how Mackenzie King desperately tried to avoid antagonizing his foreign partners without upsetting the fragile unity at home. When forced to choose, Mackenzie King invariably preferred to risk the ire of either Churchill or Roosevelt rather than that of French Canada. While the volatile relationship between French and English Canadians is familiar to Canadian readers, Courteaux’s study reveals the intricate ways in which this issue related to foreign affairs in the Second World War.

Courteaux is less successful in convincing the reader that Canadian views on France influenced those of its senior partners. For instance, Courteaux argues that officials in the Department of External Affairs were convinced as early as 1940 that de Gaulle was the only viable future French leader. This coincided with their insistence that despite its defeat France should retain its great-power status after the war. While the senior partners eventually came around to this view – the British in 1942 and the Americans more reluctantly in 1944 – there is no indication that Canada influenced this change.

Courteaux’s tendency to quote heavily from well-worn Canadian histories gives the false impression of a study based largely on secondary sources. In reality, however, this study engages a vast array of primary sources from Canadian, British, French, and American archives. The outlines of this story will be familiar to those with any knowledge of this period of Canadian history, but Courteaux’s skilful illustration of the relationship between domestic and foreign policy makes it well worth reading.