The Cold War and the 1984 Olympic Games: A Soviet-American Surrogate War by Philip A. D’Agati (review)

In recent years, a growing body of academic literature has analyzed the role of international sport, including the Olympic Games, in the Cold War. Philip A. D’Agati’s book contributes to this field of enquiry by looking at why the Soviet Union (and most of its allies) chose to boycott the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics. The author re-examines the traditional assumption that Soviet non-participation was a direct and inevitable consequence of the Carter administration’s boycott of the Moscow Games four years previously, in protest at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. D’Agati provides an alternative interpretation to this “tit-for-tat” reasoning, instead suggesting that the boycott was a consequence of a complex series of considerations within an overarching “surrogate war” between the United States and the USSR, and drawing on the bidding process (and subsequent hosting) associated with the 1976, 1980, and 1984 Olympics in particular.

D’Agati’s methodological framework combines a relatively straightforward historical narrative with aspects of international relations theory. In relation to the latter he uses both the idea of “surrogate war” and George Tsebelis’s concept of “nested games” (whereby the observed outcome might not be the main aim of any particular action). As such, D’Agati disputes that the Soviet action was simply retaliation for the U.S. boycott of 1980, suggesting instead that it was the result of a complex set of considerations relating in particular to external projections of the “success” of Moscow’s Games. D’Agati acknowledges that he has made no use of Soviet and Russian sources (even though many relevant items have been declassified in Moscow in recent years) but suggests that by adopting an alternative methodological approach he is able to overcome such difficulties. He relies on a three-tiered analysis, examining material from the USSR’s allies (especially Bulgaria, which also boycotted in 1984); correspondence between the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC); and a broad historical analysis of the politicization of international sport by the Soviet Union. Such an approach is not without its problems, not least the lack of Russian-language primary sources. In addition, much of the discussion of Soviet “concerns” (including the potential actions of the “Ban the Soviets” coalition and other security problems) is based on a write-up of a single meeting between the IOC, the Soviet National Olympic Committee (NOC), and the LAOOC in early 1984.

After relatively straightforward examinations of the history and politics of the Olympic movement and the development of a Soviet international sports policy, D’Agati examines the bidding processes for the 1976, 1980, and 1984 Summer Games. He analyzes it within the context of the surrogate war between East and West. Three cities bid for the right to host the 1976 Games: Montreal—the eventual winner, albeit subsequently discredited for unfinished stadia and crippling financial mismanagement—Moscow, and Los Angeles. Round two and the right to host the 1980 Games went to Moscow (ahead of Los Angeles, with a less-than-stellar bid). Finally, Los Angeles was awarded the Games of 1984, albeit as the sole bidder. The bidding and hosting processes and their interpretation as central tenets of a surrogate war between East and West provide the basis for the rest of the book. D’Agati’s thesis is directly linked to the unique status of the LAOOC—it was a private, for-profit enterprise, and neither the state nor federal government was directly involved. As a consequence this was not an environment familiar to or comfortable for Soviet officials, and in negotiations with the IOC and LAOOC, the Soviet NOC raised a succession of concerns about the organization of the Games, not least relating to guarantees of security for the Soviet delegation. Security issues became the official reason for the Soviet boycott, which was announced in April 1984...