The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Enduring Freedom by Adrian R. Lewis (review)

The strategic utility and perceived morality of airpower are what led to its inclusion within the foundations of American warfare after World War I. Proportionate and discriminate targeting of the enemy became the mantra of U.S. officials, many of whom had watched aghast as the “Old World” of Britain and Germany had been embroiled in a disproportionate and indiscriminate war of attrition from 1914 through 1918. World War I had not only resulted in more than 200,000 U.S. casualties, but had seen the mass killing and deliberate targeting of civilian populations. Consequently, in social, political, and strategic dimensions the culture of American warfare began to change. Reducing enemy civilian casualties while mitigating the number of U.S. soldiers killed became the primary goals of the United States. By the time World War II began, airpower and its perceived precision characteristics were deemed the silver bullet to achieve these goals while maintaining U.S. strategic superiority.

Adrian R. Lewis, a professor of history at the University of Kansas who earlier was a major in the U.S. Army, points to this period as the starting point of a new age of warfare. He argues that “World War II ushered in the new age of airpower, and by doing so initiated a process of transformation that would ultimately end with the elimination of ground forces as major combatants in war” (p. 41). According to Lewis, this marked the start of a significant transformation in the American culture of war; namely, “the removal of the American people from the conduct of the wars of the United States” (p. 366). Lewis contends that these changes have left the United States in a situation in which “Americans willingly expend hundreds of billions of dollars annually on the means for war, but do not show up for the fight” (p. 492). This state of affairs, Lewis argues, has not only left the public disconnected from American warfare but has also left the United States short of boots on the ground in its most recent conflicts.

This book, from a European perspective, may be compelling, but Lewis’s omission of a detailed study of World War I is striking. Even if European and American perceptions of history differ slightly, the influence of World War I on the way wars are waged is undeniable. However, this does not detract from the merit of Lewis’s concluding recommendations, which seek to remedy numerous issues raised in the book.

Lewis, in bringing his two worlds together, the academic and the military, suggests that by enrolling thousands of military officers and non-commissioned officers in the university system, they can be exposed to differing languages, ideologies, cultures, debates, and discussions. Lewis wants “the best educated, smartest forces on earth” (p. 501), which, although relatively small, will be able to make informed and educated decisions to solve problems faced in future conflicts. As such, Lewis’s impassioned recommendations for the future, alongside his detailed study of the past, make the book of obvious value to academics, policymakers, and military officers.

Proceeding through the major U.S. conflicts after World War I—World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the 1991 Gulf War, the 2003 Iraq War, and the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan—Lewis provides a captivating analysis of the U.S. experience of war. He also gives a cogent assessment of cultural theory and the contribution culture can make to the way wars are fought. In offering a convincing argument for people at all levels of scholarship to consider, the book succeeds. Yet, Lewis has a mission as well as a message, and his opinion repeatedly shines through. For balance, this book should be read and taught alongside Christopher Coker’s War in an Age of Risk (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2009) and P. W...