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M A R C H / A P R I L 2 0 0 8 W W W. T I K K U N . O R G T I K K U N 21 H uman life teems with temptations, one of which is to think that thepeoplewhodograveharmtoothersarefundamentallydifferentfromus. We reserve a special vocabulary for them: “beasts,” “monsters,” “inhuman.” Yet that outlook is a self-protective delusion. As Primo Levi somewhat shockinglyremarksoftheconcentrationcampguardsatAuschwitz: “These were not monsters. I didn’t see a single monster in my time in the camp. Instead I saw people like you and I who were acting in that way because there was Fascism , Nazism in Germany. Were some form of Fascism or Nazism to return, there would be people, like us, who would act in the same way, everywhere. And the same goes for the victims, for the particular behaviour of the victims about which so much has been said, mostly typically by young Israelis who object ‘but we would never act that way’. They’re right. They would not act that way. But if they had been born forty years earlier, they would have. They would have behaved exactly as the deported Jews—and,it’sworthadding,thedeportedRussiansandItaliansandtherest” (“Interview with Primo Levi (1979),” in The Voice of Memory: Interviews 1961-1987 [New York:TheNewPress,2001]). One must distinguish between degrees of wrongdoing, to be sure. Yet, honesty requires recognizingthatLevi’spointappliestoeachofus.Thedisturbingfactisthateventhosewho committerriblewrongsarebyandlargenot“beasts,”butratheralltoohuman—characteristicallyandpredictablyhuman ,onemightevenargue.Lookintoyourheartandrecallthelast time you treated another badly. Nearly everyone has wronged another. Remember too your responsetothelasttimeyoufeltmistreatedorinsulted.Nearlyeveryonehassufferedthebitterinjusticeofwrongdoing .Wehaveallstrugglednottoretaliateinkind. What a struggle it is to resist the cycle of retaliation! Revenge impulsively surges in responsetowrong ,andbecomesperverselydelicioustothosepossessedbyit.Theagonyofour predicamentisasancientasitiswellestablished,andHomer’sAchillesarticulatesitincomparablywell : Why,Iwishthatstrifewouldvanishawayfromamonggodsandmortals, andgall,whichmakesamangrowangryforallhisgreatmind, thatgallofangerthatswarmslikesmokeinsideofaman’sheart andbecomesathingsweetertohimbyfarthanthedrippingofhoney (Iliad18.107-110,trans.R.Lattimore). Vengefulness, resentment, and moral hatred cloud judgment but seem sweet to the one they possess, transforminga peaceful characterintoa connoisseur of violence. Personaland national credos proudly anchor themselves in tales of unfairness and the glories of retaliation .Oceansofbloodandmountainsofbonesaretheirtestament.Itisanaddictivecycle. Forgiveness is and should be of intense concern to us in ordinary life, both as individuals and as communities. Not surprisingly, the discussions of forgiveness, apology, and reconciliation in theology, literature, political science, sociology, and psychology are Forgiveness and Apology: What, When, Why? by Charles L. Griswold 6.Politics_4.qxd:Politics 2/10/08 3:18 PM Page 21 22 T I K K U N W W W. T I K K U N . O R G M A R C H / A P R I L 2 0 0 8 innumerable.Inadevelopmentofgreatimportance,TruthandReconciliationCommissions have been forging powerful new approaches to ancient conflicts. Groundbreaking work in conflictresolution,internationallaw,thetheoryofreparations,andpoliticaltheorypaysever moreattentiontoforgivenessandtherelatedconceptsofpardon,excuse,mercy,pity,apology ,andreconciliation.Yet,everypositiontakenintheoryorpracticewithregardtothesenotions assumes that it has understood them accurately. In particular, a defensible analysis of forgivenessinbothitsinterpersonalandpoliticaldimensioniscrucial;forhowelseareweto know that when we say we forgive, or apologize, or reconcile, we are doing what we claim, andnotsomethingelse? At first blush, the answer to the question “what is forgiveness?” seems perfectly straightforward .Toforgiveistostophatingthepersonorpersonswhohaveinjuredyou.Noticethat even this commits to a criterion: if you still hate someone, you have not forgiven them. But have you forgiven them if you’ve stopped hating them no matter what the reason? Say you forgot all about them or the injury caused to you (you took the latest bliss drug, or had brain surgerythatdeletedthatpartofyourmemory,orpossessaremarkableabilitytorepressfrom consciousnessemotionsyoudonotlike).Sinceforgivingisnotforgetting,itmustbethecase that it requires remembering; so that too is a criterion. And if you stop hating, while not forgetting , but still take revenge, you haven’t forgiven: so revenge too must be forsworn, if forgivenessistotakeplace . Resentmentormoralhatredmayrightlybefelt;indeed,wewouldsurelythinkillofaperson who responded to injustice with indifference. One should feel angry in response to wrongdoing; it can be a warranted emotion that expresses self-respect, a respect for moral principle,andtheresolvetodefendoneself.Consequently,ifforgivenessrequiresthatresentmentbeforsworn ,itcannotbeinspiteofthefactthattheangerisstillwarranted.Itmustbe becausetheangerisnolongerwarranted.Andwhatwouldprovideareasonthatmakesitno longerwarranted? Answers to this question diverge at the deepest level, but here is mine: the victim’s anger attheoffendershouldbeforswornfirstandforemostbecausetheoffenderhastakencertain steps that render continued anger inappropriate. What are those steps? Ideally, they will includeacknowledgmentofresponsibilityforhavingdonethewrong ;repudiationindeedand wordofoneselfasthewrongdoer,andacommitmenttobecomethesortofpersonwhodoes not do such things; the expression of regret to the victim for the specific wrong done by the offender; and finally, some sort of narrative accounting for how one came to do wrong, how thewrong-doingdoesnotexpressthetotalityofone’scharacter,andhowoneischangingfor...

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