Eldorado: Canada’s National Uranium Company by Robert Bothwell, and: Steel at the Sault: Francis H. Clergue, Sir James Dunn, and the Algoma Steel Corporation 1901–1956 by Duncan McDowall (review)

REVIEWS 429 Eldorado: Canada's NationalUranium Company. ROBERT BOTHWELL. Toronto: University of TorontoPress •984.Pp.xiv,47o.$24.95 Steel attheSault: Francis H. Clergue, SirJames Dunn,andtheAlgoma Steel Corporation •9o•-•956. r)UNCAN MCr)OWALL. Toronto: University ofToronto Press •984. Pp.x, 326.$35.oo While thehistory ofCanadian enterprises inthenineteenth century has been well explored andintegrated intobroadertrends of development, for the period sinceWorldWar • the fieldhasbeenlargelyleft tojournalists, sociologists, and the occasional Royal Commission. To someextent this situation reflects thereluctance ofCanadian business (and crown corporations) toopentheir records to historians, or the absence of systematic records management. Fortunately, thissituation ischanging, andthebooks reviewed hererepresentimportant contributionsto the field basedon substantial research intohithertountappedsources. Company histories, however, canhave limited utility forbusiness historians because of theirrestricted focus andperspective. Theauthors, bothprofessional historians, seek tocircumvent these limitations andplace their subjects in broader political andeconomic contexts. The question remains, however, do these books contribute to our understanding of theevolution of Canadian business in thetwentieth century? McDowall's history ofAlgoma Steel unfolds likeatextbook case study ofbad andgoodmanagement. Despite continuous government support through tariffprotection andrail andshellcontracts, for morethanthreedecades the company failedtofulfillitsinitialaimtocreate anintegrated anddiversified steel complex atSaultSteMarie.Overcapitalized attheoutset, dominated by twogroupsof cautious absentee owners,tiedto a diminishing rail market, Algoma staggered from crisisto crisis. Thekeyfactorinthehistory ofthecompany seems tohave been centralized control, or itsabsence, at thetop.Algoma's founder,Francis Clergue, had vision but lackedthe resources to accomplish hisaims;hissuccessors had resources butlacked vision. NotuntilJames Dunnengineered a takeover of Algoma in theGreatDepression didthecompany acquire thedirection and resources neededtoemergeasa 'matureanddiversified' steel manufacturer. While McDowall iscareful topointoutthatAlgoma's fortunes were crucially affected bythefortuitous adventofWorldWarn (andDunn's cultivation ofa close, though notalways happy, linkwithC.D.Howe), thestructure ofthebook necessarily focuses attention ontheelement ofpersonal leadership. In thissense McDowall sees Algoma as'athrowback totheearlier phase of North American business' whose ultimate successwas the result of Dunn's personal commitment andcontrol, making thesteel enterprise aunique case in aneracharacterized bytherise of' "managerial" capitalism' (•52).ButAlgoma may have been less unique thanMcDowall implies. A strikingly large number ofmajorCanadian companies - including conglomerates - haveremained 430 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW underfamilyor individual control;andobservers suchasPhilipBurchand Edward Herman havechallenged theproponents of 'managerial capitalism' even in the United States. In Bothwell's Eldorado thereare strongpersonalities aswell:the LaBine brothers whoestablished theminingenterprise toexploitthelucrative radium marketin the •93os;C.D. Howe, who supervised the transformation of Eldorado intoa crowncorporation in WorldWar n; andHowe's henchman, BillBennett,whomanaged thecompany throughthe'uraniumboom'ofthe •95os.ButBothwell's analysis emphasizes thepointthatEldorado's fortunes wereshaped bytheuniquecircumstances of theindustryduringandafter World War n. In •94o when Gilbert LaBine closedthe mine at Great Bear Lake, 'Eldorado's cycle wasalmost complete' asanenterprise exploiting a lucrative butshort-lived market(76).The abruptdemandforuraniumforatomic bomb development notonlyresuscitated theventure butledalmost inevitably toits nationalization as a form of (to use Hugh Aitken'sphrase)'defensive expansion' in response to pressures from theAmericanandBritishgovernments on Canada for accessto and control over the vital material. As a crown corporation Eldorado operated inacompletely artificial market withonly one customer, theusAtomicEnergyCommission, whose demandwasdetermined almost entirely bythepolitical andmilitarypressures ofthenuclear arms race. Eldoradowasconsequently unusualnot only in termsof its economic environment butasacrown corporation thatsimultaneously exploited itsown uranium supplies andacted asrepresentative forallotherCanadian suppliers. In theendthisanomalous aspect crucially weakened thecompany since 'it naturally looked toitsownpreservation... butasthegovernment's agent ithad alsoto safeguard theCanadian industryasa whole'(426). Nobriefsummary canbegintodojustice totheintricacies of bureaucratic politics, international diplomacy, andcommercial maneuvring thatBothwell covers inhisnarrative. Themajorproblem forthebusiness historian isfitting thisconvoluted taleintoabroaderperspective. The uraniumindustry was not entirely unique - defence contractors, particularly in theairframefield,have hadsimilar experiences in dealingin an artificial marketsubject to political ratherthaneconomic considerations. Butthecurious history ofEldorado and theCanadian uraniumindustry up to •96omayindeedbesounusual thatit can only beunderstood inthepeculiar context ofatomic weapons development duringWorldWar n andtheColdWar. GRAHAM TAYLOR Dalhousie University The Enterprises ofRobert Hamilton: A Study ofWealth and Influence inEarlyUpper Canada, x776-x8x2. BRt•½E G.WILSO•. Ottawa: Carleton University Press •983 . Pp.248.$9.95 Withthepublication of TheEnterprises ofRobert Hamilton BruceWilsonhas ...