Abstract

We say of people who act morally that they deserve to be happy, especially when acting morally comes at the price of happiness. We find this thought, especially in a Kantian framework, puzzling. If we define morality and its value independently of happiness, how can it be that we deserve happiness when we act morally? We seek to answer these questions by first looking at Kant’s discussion of a causal connection of morality and happiness in the highest good, which we do not find explanatorily satisfying, before examining possible good-makers of happiness that might explain why happiness is, even for a Kantian, a proper reward for moral behaviour.

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Additional Information

ISSN
2154-154X
Print ISSN
0276-2080
Pages
pp. 123-142
Launched on MUSE
2015-02-13
Open Access
No
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