Britain & the War for the Union by Brian Jenkins (review)

REVIEWS 67 ambits,sheignores.Imaginea bookonJewsin Canadawhichcontains a chapter each onthetinyhamlets ofHirsch andEdenbridge, Saskatchewan, but nothing onWinnipeg. To Canadian Jewry,Winnipeg waswhatVilnawasto European Jewry- acentre ofidealism andcreativity, andthesource ofmany ofthecountry's foremost Jewish intellectual, cultural,andpolitical figures. In thisradical-chic-perhaps romantic-chic wouldbeamoreaptdescription - version ofthehistory ofJewsin Canada thereisapparently noroomforthe Jewishsocial-democrat. DavidLewisis not evenmentioned, A.A. Heaps appears onlyasa spokesman ontherefugee issue, whiletheJewish Labour Committee and the leadinganti-Communist unionleaders- the Spivaks, Shanes, Herbsts- are obvious onlybecause of their absence. Nor canParis bringherself todealwithperhaps thetwokeyelements toanunderstanding of Jewish lifeinthiscountry- theroleof thesynagogue andof Zionism. Jews isstrongest whereParis canrelyontheresearch ofothers. Whenshe mustdependon her ownresources, however, sheisin deeptrouble.She accepts, almost uncritically, most ofwhatthose sheinterviewed tellher.Thus weareprovided withself-servingalbeit moving - stories ofJewish settlement inthewest andtheJewish Communist. Almost asembarrassing isherextensive examinationof anti-Semitismin Quebec,which entirely omits Maurice Duplessis andbarely mentions thefountandmajor disseminator ofJew-hatred intheprovince, theRoman Catholic church. Yet with all its faults, this is a book which is difficult to dismissand even harder toputdown. Whatitlacks indepth, perspective, andanalysis, italmost makes upforincolour, passion, anddrama. Paris has areal'feel' forthepeople about whomshe writes. Her spiritandexcitement arecontagious. Youmaynot learnanything newfromherstory, butit leaves youfeelinggood- andin today's world,perhaps thatisenough. IRVIN•; ABEL•.• Glendon College, York University Britain & theWarfor theUnion, Volume•. BRIAN JENKINS. Montreal,McGillQueen 's University Press, •98o.Pp.47o.$•6.5o. Thisisthesecond andconcluding volume ofJenkins comprehensive study of Britain's response to theAmerican CivilWar.It covers theAnglo-American relationship fromthesummer of •86• tothespring of 1865. Jenkins analyses themany factors which influenced theBritish government's decision in 186• not to intervenein the conflictand which determined British neutrality throughout thewar. Onemightwellaskwhythereisa needforanother bookonBritish policy duringtheAmerican CivilWar.Jenkins provides a newsynthesis anduses papers notavailable toearlier scholars. Hegoes beyond thearguments ofE.D. Adams (•9•5) andFrankLawrence Owsley (•93•) whostated thatwarprofits andeconomic benefits dictated British policy. Heexpands thethesis ofDonald- 68 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW sonJordanandEdwinJ. Pratt(•93•) thatstrongsupportin Britainfor the emancipation of the slaves provideda counterweight to thosewho urged intervention in America.He differsfrom FrankMerli (•97o)whoarguedthat severalfactors,suchasthe influenceof nationalinterest,the absence of any precisedefinitionof neutrality,and the fear of establishing unfortunate precedents with respect to interferencein the domestic affairsof first-class powers andthemaritime rightsofneutrals, explaintheactions ofPalmerston's cabinet. Jenkins argues thatmanyfactors determined Britishneutrality. Firstofall, SirJohnHarding,thequeen's advocate andnorthernsympathizer, persuaded thecabinet thata cautious approach wasthebestresponse totheCivilWar. Thisadvice wasreinforcedbyWilliamSeward, theAmericansecretary ofstate, whoimpressed upontheBritishgovernment thatretribution wouldbeexacted foranymeddling intheconflict beyond theinitialandresented recognition of Confederate belligerency. Secondly, Jenkins demonstrates thattheeconomic arguments opposing involvement in Americaformedthebackground against whichdecisions weremade.There wasnodesiretojeopardizethe material interests, the prosperity, andthevastwealthof tradewithAmerica,including southern cotton,byentanglement in thatconflict.He shows thattheeconomic arguments cutbothwaysandin thelongrun weremoreforcefulto support neutralitythantochoose eitherside.He states thatconsideration for material interests reinforcedthe argumentfor a cautious approach and servedasa justification for inaction compelled byotherfactors. Thirdly,Jenkins argues that Britain tightenedher neutralityin •863 because of the need to keep relationswith the United Statesquiescent in order to strengthenBritain's diplomatic position in Europe.Britishleaders fearedthecontinental powers mighttakeadvantage of herinvolvement in theCivilWar,embarrass her,or ignoreherwhenshepulledout.Reinforcing thisviewwasRussell's indignation attheConfederate circumvention oftheForeign Enlistment Actandagrowing awareness of the dangerousprecedents Britain might be establishing for herselfin futurewars.Lastly, Jenkinsstates therewasa moralreason which favoured acautious policy. Palmerston wasreluctant toinvolve hisnationinthe creationof a Confederacy whichstronglysupported slavery because of the stronganti-slavery sentiment in Britain. Thiscomprehensive, analytical study synthesizes awiderangeof public and privatepapersandsecondary materialandmakes a valuable contribution to thescholarship onBritain'sneutralityduringAmerica's CivilWar. SHERRILL BROWN WELLS Department ofState, Washington The MapleLeafandtheWhite Eagle. ALOYSlUS BALAWYDER. NewYork,Columbia University Press, •98o.Pp.viii,300.$•o.oo. CanadaandPolandhaveonegreatcommoncharacteristic: theyareboththe ...