The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941 by R.J.C. Butow (review)

REVIEWS 367 third isthe argumentthattheBankingAct of •935 constituted amajorAdministrationvictoryandamajormovetowardeffectivemonetarymanagement . Here Burns adoptstheconventional interpretation,buttheevidencesheofferstendsto showthe opposite,that Glasswasnot exaggeratinggreatlyin sayingthat he 'did not leave enoughof theEccles bill withwhichtolighta cigarette.'The outcomewascloserto the strengthened FederalReservesystem that Glassadvocated than to the type of controls envisioned byMarriner Eccles, andwhentherewasnolongera meetingof the minds between Federal Reserve and other executive leaders this would become apparent. On balance, this isa welcome and substantial addition to the literature. ELLIS W. HAWLEY University ofIowa TheJohnDoeAssociates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, •r94•r.Rj.c. BUTOW. Stanford, StanfordUniversity Press, •974.PP.x, 48o,illus.$•6.95. By meansof painstaking multiarchival and multilingualresearch,RobertButow,a veteran scholarof Japanese-American relations,reconstructsand illuminatesa hithertoobscure dimensionof thefutile effort toavoidwarin the Pacificin •94•. It is thecurious storyofaprivateconspiracy for peace orchestrated byJames M. Drought, the aggressive vicar-generalof the CatholicForeign MissionSocietyof America, Hideo Iwakuro, a Japanesearmy colonel,and Tadao Paul Wikawa, a Japanese businessman. Withapromoter's instinct andapublicist's talent,FatherDrought,thetrio'sleader, used 'the Catholic connection' (PostmasterGeneral Frank Walker in the Roosevelt cabinetandtheForeignMission's Japanese friends)topropelhisgrouptothecentre of Japanese-American diplomacy.Because of hisowninexperienceand fumbling, theJapanese Ambassador Kichisabur6 Nomura wasparticularlysusceptible to the group's'pernicious influence,'Butowargues,andsoenabledthemto haveaparticularly dramaticeffecton the talksbetweenNomura and Secretaryof StateCordell Hull through •94•. Butow finds that every proposaloffered either formally or informallybyJapanand the United States after the springof that year- fourteen documents in all - originatedwith an April proposalauthoredby the ubiquitous Father Drought, though with Nomura's blessings. This intervention produced a tangleof subtle misconceptions in subsequent communications andmadeevenmore difficultthequestfor peacefulsolutions. Butow's criticisms of Nomuraareespecially telling.Sodeterminedwastheambassador to playhisownhandthat he frequently withheldvitalinformationfrombothTokyoandWashington. Butowissopersuasive onthispoint,in fact,thatonewonders whowasusingwhoin theDrought-Nomura relationship. Butow's book,then,isinlargepartanextendedcommentary ontheHull-Nomura talks,acarefulexegesis ofthediplomatic texts;andDrought's influenceuponthemis clear.But the impactof theJohn Doe Associates, asthe StateDepartmentdubbed Drought'sgroup,ontheoverallnatureofJapanese-American diplomacy isanother 368 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW question. AndhereButowmaybepronetoexaggeration. Thereisnoevidence, for example,that StateDepartmentofficialswould haveviewedthe basicissues of Japanese-American relations anydifferentlywithouttheassociates' interference. In fact,Butow's scrupulous research shows justhowdisinterested theStateDepartment wasin seeking amodus vivendi withJapanafterthesummerof •94•. Throughouthisaccount Butowisgenerally verysympathetic towardHull andhis men;buthedoes partcompany withthemonthequestion oftheKonoye-Roosevelt summitmeeting. And thisisa majorpoint.LiketheAmerican Ambassador Joseph Grew at the time and revisionist critics later, Butow believes FDR should have ignoredStateDepartmentopposition and followedhisinitialimpulseto accept PrinceKonoye's August proposal foraPacific summit. FatherDroughthadincluded sucha proposal in hisApril memorandum, thoughit disappeared from subsequent documents. Its verystaleness, contends Butowin oneof hisleastconvincing arguments ,helpstoaccount for theStateDepartmentrejection. And thatwasatragedy.For'a"summitmeeting" inthePacific,' Butowconcludes, 'wouldhavebeenabetterpolicychoicethannomeetingatall,for whocansaywith certaintythata conference wouldhavebeenunproductive in everyrespect?' (32o). Whether, asButowclaims,this missedopportunitywouldhavebeenmore easily avertedif theJohnDoeAssociates hadneverbecome partof thediplomaticgameis, of course,debatable.His evidencesuggests, in fact, that more would havebeen accomplished hadsomeof FatherDrought'szealotryfor peacematerialized in the StateDepartmentandWhite House. R. CUFF YorkUniversity Holding the Line:TheEisenhower Era, i 952-• 96•. CHARLES ALEXANDER. Bloomington, IndianaUniversityPress,1975.Pp. 326. Eisenhower: Portrait ofthe Hero.}'EVER LYON. Boston, Little,Brown,1974.Pp.937. Eisenhowerand the American Crusades.HERBERTS. }'ARMET.New York, Macmillan [Toronto,Collier-Macmillan],1972.Pp.xii,66o,illus.$14.25. The thirty-fourth presidentof the United Statesremainsa riddle to American commentators. In termsof accomplishment, administrative grasp,and soundjudgment ,DwightDavidEisenhower dwarfshisimmediatepredecessor (thecurrentpop culturehero)aswellashisfour electedsuccessors. Yet for a generationweanedon thecartoons of Herbert Block,it appearsdifficulttoattributesuccess toEisenhoweramanwhoexemplifiedsimpleAmericanvirtues , whounderstood andrespected the constitutional separation of powers,andasoldierwhorecognized thehorrorsof war far betterthanmostcivilianpresidents. For the true measure of Eisenhower, we must turn not to the American historical establishment but to the mavericks:William ApplemanWilliams,• BartonJ. Bern- 'Officers andGentlemen,' NewYork Review ofBooks, xvI,6 May•97•, 3-8; reprintedin Williams,Some Presidents: FromWilson toNixon(New York •979), 6•-8 • ...