Logistics and the Failure of the British Army in America, 1775–1783 by Arthur R. Bowler (review)

338 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW Logistics andtheFailureoftheBritish ArmyinAmerica, t 775-t 783. ARTHUR R.BOWLER. Princeton,PrincetonUniversityPress,•975. PP.xii, 29o.$•2.5o. This studyis one of three booksoriginating as dissertations directedby Ian R. Christieat UniversityCollege,London, and dealingwith variousaspects of the logistical problems experienced by BritishforcesduringtheAmericanRevolution. How dependent wasthearmyonBritain,Bowlerasks, andhowdid thisdependence influenceoperationsduring the war?In answeringthesequestions he disclaims significantly modifyingtheconclusions of PiersMackesy, WilliamWillcox,andFrank and Mary Wickwireon confusionin strategy,administration, and the qualityof British command.These were criticalfactorsbut, he argues,both the fighting efficiency andthementality of thecommanders wereaffected bylogistical problems. Contraryto whathashithertobeenassumed theBritisharmywasnotaninvincible fightingforcewithawell-established logistical andadministrative base.Itsorganizationalstructurein Americadatedonlyfrom thesuccessful prosecution of theSeven Years'War, andtherebellionpresented newproblems andposedoldonesona new scale. Logistics andstrategy weredetermined initiallyatthecabinet leveland,aswith themechanism for controlandimplementation of thefightingforces,theorganization for logisticalsupportwasin need of reform. The nature of the rebellion accentuated the shortcomings of the system, but beforetheywererecognized and corrected theyhadcontributedsignificantly to thefailureof thearmyin America. After •775NorthAmericansources werenolongerdependable. A forceof 2o,ooo menrequiredthirty-three tons offoodeach day.Twoofeveryfivehorses engaged in thefieldwererequiredsimplytohaulfodder,thusleading commanders toputoff operations untilthegrowing season inthelatespring. Dependent onNorthAmerica for freshfood, forage,and fuel, the army couldnot hold territorywith weak, unsupported detachments andpursue therebelfieldforces without invitingdisaster. Britishcontrolextendedonly when and for asfar astheir forcesmovedout in strengthfrom fortified strongpoints.Attemptsto forageand live off the land broughtmeagerresults, madethetroops vulnerable torebelinterdiction, andprejudicedthesupport of potential loyalists andneutrals whosufferedfromthedemands ofthesometimes callous soldiery andoccasionally unscrupulous commissaries. Consequently thearmyhadtorelyonBritainand,whensupplies fromhomefailed, rations were cut, morale fell, desertionsmounted, and commanders curtailed their operations, asboth Howe and Clintonwerereluctantto takethe field without bringing withthemalltheprovisions theywouldneedforacampaign. Notuntil•78• was anadequate organization forsupplying thearmyfromBritaindeveloped, butby thattime,withpolitical opposition to thewarmountingrapidly,it neededonlythe defeatof Cornwallisto bring a majorityin Parliamentto demandan end to the conflict.The failureof supplyhelpedmakethe militaryoperations of the previous yearsindecisive. Theseconclusions maybe severely testedin the recentstudyby Ira Gruber,The HoweBrother• andthe American Revolution (•972). The rebelsduringtheearlyyearsof the conflictwere far from united in oppositionto Britain; the Congress wasnot always solidlyagainst a negotiated settlement; andWashington wasall tooeagerto REVIEWS 339 risk his army, sometimes on lessthan even terms, in decisivebattle. All things considered, Gruberconcludes therebellion couldhavebeenbrokenintheearlyyears whenBowlersees logistical failuresaspreventingvictory.Gruberisemphaticthat although bureaucratic tangles created shortages, theseattimesprovidedapretext for inactionand'did nothavea majorbearing'onthe Howes'performance (354).The brothersHowedidnotadjusttheirstrategy toaccommodate thesupplysituation but rathertocomplement apolicyofpolitical rapprochment withtherebels, astrategy they initiatedand imposedon themselves. Although BowlerlistsGruber'swork in his bibliography, nowherein histextdoeshe cometo gripswith theargumentthatso compromises hisownmajorconclusion. JACK SOSIN University ofNebraska, Lincoln AHistory ofthe British Cavalry, • 8• 6-•9• 9. II; 1851--I 87•. "r•. M,•RQV•.SS OrANGLESEY. London,ArchonBooks,1975.Pp.519,maps,illus.$27.5o. The Marquessof Angleseyundertooka difficult taskwhen he setout to write A Historyof theBritishCavalry.The nature of his difficultyis nicelyillustratedby a cartoonhe reproducesfrom the 3ø September1854issueof Punch.Entitled'The Plungerin Turkey,' it shows ajunior cavalryofficersprawled in frontof histentand saying toafriend,withthelispaffected attheperiod,'I sayOldFellah-Do youthink it pwobable the Infantry will accompany usto Sebastopol?' The pointof the cartoonist 's gibewas,of course, itsimplication thatwealthyyoungofficers in fashionable mountedregimentsweretooasininetorealisethattherecouldbenowarwithoutthe infantry,thearm whichhadlongbeen'theQueenof Battles,'towhomtheheaviest fightingfell.Thisisnottosaythatcavalry werenotindispensable too.Their mobility madethemidealtroopsfor scouting, and for service in advanced, flank,and rearguards .Rightlyusedfor shock actiontheycouldturn theroutofbeateninfantryinto ruin; and,whenthingswentwrong,theywereinvaluablefor coveringa retreat.But warisnomoreasoloperformance byonearmthanasymphony isasoloperformance byoneinstrument. Asstrings, drums,andwindareallneededtoplayasymphony, so horse,foot,andgunswereallneededtofightabattle.In eithercase theauthor,who triesto writethe historyof oneinstrumentalone,confrontshimselfwith a tough problemof perspective, of presenting thereaderwithanaccount ofwhathisspecial subject didwithoutmissing thecontextinwhichit wasdone;andthatmeansputting the services of all arms- cavalry,infantry, artillery,engineers,and commissariat into focus.When I saythat in my view the Marquessof Anglesey'saccountsof campaigns sometimes fail in thismatter of focus,I hope readerswho acceptthe criticism will not forgetthedifficultyof thetask. Only about half of this book, however,is concernedwith operations- in the Crimea,in the PersianWar of 1856-7, the Indian Mutiny,theNorthwestFrontierin 1863-4, andthe Abyssinian Campaignof 1867-8. The restof the bookdealswith administration,training, livingconditionsin barracks,officerselectionand education , and the purchaseof horses. This isperhapsthe mostvaluablepart of it. The ...