The Howe Brothers and the American Revolution by Ira D. Gruber (review)

220 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW readerstill asks-why? Povertycannotbe treatedonly as an administrative problem.Nor canreliefbe explainedby the mellowingattitudesof 'society' or evenof 'theVictoriancitizen.'The readerisneverreminded that duringmost of the periodcovered by thisbook,the labouringpoor- at timeseventhoseon relief- greatlyexceeded in absolute numbers themenpresuming tocontrol their lives.The historyof povertyand reliefwill be built on foundation studies of dangerous classes, employment, prices, labourdiscipline, andpower.Onlya few of the contributors haveseenit in thoseterms,or gatheredthe strawto make thebricks.And historians will rightlybegrudge paying$x6.oofor theessays that will interestthem,whichmightbetterhaveappeared asarticles. For theprice, the publishers shouldnot havecommitted a score of obvious typographical and editorialerrors.To take three: we are told (p. •9•) that mediaevalmen experienced life in 'sociometric units'like the manorand guild; SamuelTaylor Coleridgeappears to be confused with SamuelColeridge Taylor (p. •93); and the statement(p. 32) that workhouses wereopposed by 'the wily and formidableDanielDefoe 'issubstantiated bya footnote whichreads, 'Defoewasa wily andformidable pamphleteer.' DOUGLAS HAY Memorial University UNITED STATES TheHoweBrothers andtheAmerican Revolution. IRA D.GRUBER. NewYbrk, Athenaeum,•972. PP.xvi, 396,maps.$•4-95. Everystudent of theAmericanRevolution hasasked himselfwhyGreatBritain, undeniably the leadingworldpowerafter the SevenYearsWar, wassounsuccessful in restoring royalgovernment to her rebellious colonies. Gruber'sbook addresses the problemby focussing on the relationship of the government and its militarycommanders from •776 to •778. He pointsout that althoughthe ministryand the Howeswere generallyagreedon maintainingParliament's supremacy andpreserving theempire,theydisagreed onwhetherthisshould be doneby conciliation or military force.The Howe brothers fanciedthat they couldturn the heroicdeathof GeorgeHowe at Ticonderoga in •758 to good accountin conciliating the colonists and restoring the empire.Thoughthe outbreakof hostilities at Lexingtonand Concordand the battle of BunkerHill gavestrength to thehawksin theministry, thedovish Howesironically became theirchosen instruments, partlybecause of theirwillingness to panderto hawk sentiment, and partlybecause of the vagaries of Britishpolitics.Gruberargues that the indecisiveness of Britishmilitary operations stemmed lessfrom ministerial uncertaintyaboutthe wisdomof conquering the colonists than from the Howes'belief that conciliationwasstill possible. Thus the contradictory roles of conquerorand peacemaker were not imposed,but voluntarilyassumed. Gruberthinksthisexplains SirWilliam'sfailuretodefeatWashington decisively REVIEWS 221 at thebattlesof LongIsland,New York, and Brandywine. He preferreddemonstratingBritishinvincibilityto destroying the rebels,hopingthat they would growdiscouraged and voluntarilylay downtheir arms.In the sameway, Lord Howe usedrestraintin enforcingthe blockadeand permittedcolonialfishermento pursuetheir livelihoodat sea. The troublewith theHowes'policywasnotinconsistency but fragility.From the beginning,'invincibility'wasbeliedby the ineffectiveness of the blockade, andit wasseriously discredited bythe defeats of Trentonand Princeton, which Grubersees asmoresignificant than Saratogain markingthe declineof British fortunes. CertainlySir William'sbehaviour in 1777,thoughconsistent with his formerstrategy of seizing territoryratherthan inflictingtotal defeat,wasirrational both in the way he pursuedthe conquest of Philadelphiaand in his irresponsible neglectof Burgoyne. Meanwhile,the ministrywas increasingly alarmedby their commanders' inabilityto end the war quickly,but fearedto removethem lesttheir friendsin Englandcreateda politicaluproar. So the war wasallowedto muddleon to the.disaster at Saratoga,and eventhen the ministryonlysucceeded in gettingrid of thesemenwhentheythemselves asked to be relievedof their commands. ThoughSir William had nothingto showfor hiseffortswhenhe returnedto Englandin the summerof I778, and though Lord Howe subsequently losthischanceto redeemthe familyhonourby confrontingthe Frenchsquadron off Newport,thanksto badluckandindecision, theyandtheirfriendssucceeded in forcinga parliamentary enquiryandembarrassing thegovernment byblamingtheirmisfortunes onmembers of thecabinet. Gruber concludes that Britain failed to regainher colonies because the Howes 'anda majorityof the ministrywereworkingin separate andmutuallydestructive waystowardsthe restoration of Britishgovernment in America'(p 362). The ministryhamstrung the Howesin their attemptsat conciliation, and the Howesin turn conducted militaryoperations in sucha way asto precludethe decisive use of force to crush the rebellion. In emphasizing therelationship between the Howesand theministry,Gruber gives an account of Britain'sfailurewhichplaysup theroleof individuals and playsdownthat of circumstance. Thus,thoughhe admitsthat conciliation was not possible on any termsshortof evacuating the continentand agreeingto negotiatewith Americansas an independent people,Gruber assumes that a militarysolution waspossible. The argumentherehasto reston Washington's vulnerability at New York and LongIsland,wherea largepart of theContinental Army might conceivably have been captured ordestroyed. Butthisrequiresusto assume that colonial resistance wouldhavecollapsed if theHowes had decisively defeatedWashington, whereas it might ratherhavestiffened if the manyaccomplices in theinitialphases of the rebellion had seen in thisa noose tightening abouttheir necks. Even thoughjudicious conciliation might haveallayedsome anxieties, it isunlikelyit wouldhaveallayedall of themand therefore it wouldnothavespared theBritishthenecessity of garrisoning much of the continent. And solongastherewasa remnantof irreconcilables and the armyleft,Britishgarrisons wouldbeasvulnerable to defeats likeTrentonand 222 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW Princeton asif theyweredispersed. If Washington had surrendered hisentire armyin September •776, it wouldundoubtedly havetakenmorethan such...