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218 THE CANADIAN HISTORICAL REVIEW powers, and therebymakeit possible for Austriato retainsomecontrolover theirwar aims.Butthealliance andAustria's partialmobilization, whichprecededit , werealsomeantto frightenRussia into accepting Western peace terms - theFour Points - whichAustriahadearliersubmitted to her,butwhich shehadflatlyrejected. The treatyof alliancesigned on 2 December1854hassometimes beeninterpretedashavingenabled theHabsburg monarchy to extract special advantages from all sides. In pointof fact,however, thoughBuolhad the satisfaction of gettingpreliminary peacetalksstarted-he had at longlastobtained Russia's unconditional acceptance of the Four Points-his success wasonly a fleeting one: owing very largely to Britain'sintransigence the Vienna conference of March-Junei855 endedin failure. By the time the military situationand an Austrianultimatumhad brought Russia oncemoreto thepeacetable,andthe treatyof Paris(3ø March •856) had put an end to the war, a clear-sighted observer could no longerhave doubtedthat Buol'spolicyof close co-operation with BritainandFrancewasa fatal,thoughprobably unavoidable mistake. Whilepermanently alienating Russia ,that policyhad not gainedAustriathe friendship of the Westernpowers. Indeed, many of their leaders-men like Palmerston, Clarendon,Russell,and Napoleonni- harboured an undyinghatredof the Habsburg monarchy, and influentialsectors of Britishpublicopinionappearto haveshared theirfeelings. ThuswhileBuolhadmanaged, forthetimebeing, tospare hiscountry thecosts and risksof war, he had led it into.dangerous isolation;and within the next decadehistorywas to exacta high price from Austriafor her recentexercise in Concertdiplomacy. The foregoing abstractdoesscarce justiceto Professor Schroeder's work.This reviewerregrets moreparticularlythat limitations of space havenotpermitted him to discuss-and heartily endorse-the views on the proper methodsof diplomatichistorywhichthe authorhassoelegantly expounded in hisPreface. KARL F. HELLEINER Universityof Toronto ComparativeDevelopment in SocialWelfare.Editedby v..w.MARTIN. London, George Allen and Unwin [Toronto,Methuen],x97e.Pp. e47.$x5.95. This book is directed at 'social historians,social administrators,and social workers.'Unlessthe publishers are simplyseeking a widemarket,theymustbelievethat comparison and generalization at any levelyieldbothhistorical insightand policyperspectives. But a collection which dealswith threecenturies and two countries,touchingon the Act of Elizabeth,Speenhamland, Charles Beard's Whiggery, andmedicalinsurance in the 196os, isfrequently uninformative for students of historyand yet too disparate or detailedfor otherreaders. The essays are of unequalvalue.Two usefulpapersbasedon unpublished theses add to the evidence slowlybeingcollected aboutthe actualoperationof workhouses andSpeenhamland. Fromanexamination o.ftheeighteenth-century REVIEWS 219 surveys and hisown localstudies in Devon,JamesS. Taylor suggests that the multitudeof smallworkhouses providedmorehumaneprotectionfor the 'impotentpoor 'thantheWebbsclaimed, anda betteradministration thanthePoor Law commissioners caredto admit.But apart from a mentionof strongdirectorsand vestryinterests, the authorfailsto suggest economic and socialfactors (openand closed parishes? conflicts betweenoverseers and the bench?)which might have causedthe differences in practicewhich he describes. Mark Nettman 'sinvestigation of Berkshire poorrelief is morefirmly basedin suchlocal detail, and addsto the evidencethat Speenhamland wage supplements were neitheran innovationin •795, nor a system run by the justices, nor a general practicein the decades beforethe new PoorLaw. He alsoshows usa struggle between cost-conscious overseers and paternaljPS.But in criticizingthe Hammonds ''oversimplified' claimthatthemagistracy gavereliefbecause theyfeared revolution, heunaccountably ignores thefactthattheyfearedriotasmuch,and that the foodriotsof •795 wereexpected and had evenbegunbeforethe date of the Speenhamland meeting.In an article on Victorian reform, E.C. Midwinterargues that thedebateaboutBenthamism andcentralism mustbejudged partlyby localevidence, and that in Lancashire beforex865localconcern for rates,and confusion of authorities, had more effectthan Chadwickianbriefs. The lastEnglishstudyis a sketch by E.W. Martin, the editor,of poorrelief from •6oo to •865 in twenty-fivepages,an inadequateintroductionto the literatureor itsproblems. Brian Abel-Smith'srapid internationalsurveyof methodsfor paying for medicalcaresuggests that therelativestrengths of doctors' andpatients'organizationsat criticaltimes,and the roleof hospitals, accountfor the main differences . Of thetworemaining papers, ontheUnited States, Blanche D. Collprovidesan intelligentshortaccountof poorrelief from colonialtimesuntil •86o, makingsuggestive comparisons, andsketching some of the xnanifest class interestsinvolved .Milton Speizman's summary of the 'welfareattitudes'of twenty Americanhistorians betweenthe Civil War and New Deal is largelyquotation. The author seldomrelatestheseto the other intellectualconcernsof the writers, their origins, or the stateof the nationat the time: 'Parrington's heartwasin the rightplace,at leastasfar asa historian of social welfareisconcerned.' Unfortunately, fewof thepapers meetthestandards calledfor in AsaBrigg's introductoryessay, which praises intensivelocal studies, carefulquantitative analysis, sensitivity to theinsights of novelists, and dedication to 'history from below.'But methodology is not enough.Too often the authorsare concerned with superimposing newmoraljudgments on old ones,ratherthan providing deeperexplanations. E.C. Midwinter,whoprovides moreevidence thansome otherauthors,nevertheless writesthat the Victorianauthorities 'areusuallyberatedfor beingoverweeningly pompous, ultracautious and static,undulysevere in attitude,extremely bourgeois and patronizingly smug.This howeveris to condemnthem for beingVictorian.Their characterwascolouredby their epoch. It wouldbeunfairto expect...

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