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  • Human Rights Under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt, and India by Yüksel Sezgin
  • Nadia Latif (bio)
Yüksel Sezgin, Human Rights Under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt, and India ( Cambridge University Press, 2013), ISBN 9781107041400, 301 pages.

In Human Rights Under State-Enforced Religious Family Laws in Israel, Egypt, and India, Yuksel Sezgin advances an ambitious approach for comparing personal status legal systems in nation-states with different histories, political configurations, and ideological orientations. The goal of this comparison is to: 1) assess the human rights consequences of these legal systems; 2) document and evaluate the strategies deployed by citizens to negotiate the infringements on their rights and liberties by these systems; and 3) to provide effective recommendations to policy makers and human rights advocates.

According to Sezgin, most personal status legal systems are inherited by postcolonial states from the legal systems of multi-ethnic empires, which used these systems to classify their subject population in terms of race, ethnicity, and religion. However, Sezgin argues it should be understood that adopting these systems was not a mere preservation of tradition. The postcolonial ruling elite play an important role in directing and operating these institutions in ways that correspond to their ideological orientation. In addition, postcolonial personal status legal systems are also shaped by the balance of power between the state [End Page 264] and religious groups. The strength of a religious group is determined by its resources. These groups are strongly opposed to state attempts to change or abrogate religious law. Hence the state can succeed in its interventions only if it co-opts, or represses religious opposition.

In conducting research for this book, Sezgin made use of qualitative methods, which provided him with rich material for analysis as well as with anecdotes that effectively illustrate his claims. He conducted field research and archival research in Israel, Egypt, India, and the United Kingdom. He observed court proceedings in these countries and interviewed religious leaders, civil and religious judges, lawyers, litigants, politicians, clergy members, women, and human rights activists.

In order to facilitate comparative analysis of his case studies, Sezgin constructed a schema of three ideal type states and their corresponding personal status legal systems based on the qualitative data he collected. He defines the relationship between the state and the personal status legal system in terms of the ideological orientation of the ruling elite, as well as the balance of power between the state and religious groups. The schema can be described as follows: exclusionary states tend to be theocratic. Hence, they have no interest in unifying the pluri-legal personal status system they have inherited. They establish fragmented confessional systems in which each religious community recognized by the state has its own courts staffed with state appointed and paid religious judges who implement the state enforced law of that community. According to Sezgin, Israel fits this model.

The second state-personal status system combination is that of the technocratic/authoritarian state and the unified confessional system. The state is not ideologically interested in personal status reform, but is motivated by centralization and the consolidation of power. Hence, it appropriates the religious law of communities it recognizes and appoints civil judges to apply it at secular state courts. Egypt is claimed to exemplify this model.

The third combination is that of the secular/inclusionary state and the unified semi-confessional system. As a consequence of its secular orientation, the state seeks to establish an institutionally and legally unified personal status system with jurisdiction over all citizens. However, due to opposition from some religious groups, this model is only able to achieve partial unification. Hence, personal status courts are unified but personal status law is not, as each religious community is governed by its own law. According to Sezgin, India corresponds to this model.

Sezgin concludes the description of this schema with the acknowledgement that although ideal types do not occur in the real world, they facilitate comparison and highlight particular features possessed by a given state and its personal status legal system. In highlighting the similarity in strategies deployed by the citizens of three different countries while negotiating infringements made on...

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