Abstract

Recent attempts to bridge Buddhist and Western philosophical accounts of perception and consciousness have been prompted in large measure by two sets of arguments: on the one hand those that set out to defend a conceptualist view of perception, and on the other those that take perception to have a self-intimating but non-conceptual aspect. This essay offers an innovative take on the conceptualist/non-conceptualist debate in the works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their followers by deriving insights from the phenomenology of perception. It argues that it is possible to conceive of the reflexivity of perceptual awareness (its self-intimating aspect) as intentionally structured without being at the same time transcendently constituted as a form of radical subjectivity.

pdf

Additional Information

ISSN
1529-1898
Print ISSN
0031-8221
Pages
pp. 227-248
Launched on MUSE
2015-02-02
Open Access
No
Back To Top

This website uses cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our website. Without cookies your experience may not be seamless.