Polybius and Roman Imperialism by Donald Walter Baronowski (review)

Donald Baronowski’s (B.’s) monograph is the first devoted to this major topic since Domenico Musti’s similarly titled Polibio e l’imperialismo romano (1978). Broader works on Polybius of course look at his attitude to Roman imperialism, but B.’s analysis is valuable for being so focused. After summarizing Polybius’ life and the work’s scope (1–13), the book surveys how intellectuals in the later Hellenistic period viewed Rome’s domination (Part I: 15–60), then discusses Polybius’ attitudes (Part II: 61–175), and concludes with extensive notes (177–212), a helpfully copious bibliography, and two indices. In this well-produced and thoroughly researched work, B. provokes fresh thinking about one of the crucial aspects of Polybius’ thought.

B. insists that Polybius approved of imperialist expansion, on the condition that it be exercised benignly and benefit those it dominated (61–68, 164–165); the Megalopolitan therefore essentially approved of Rome’s seeking imperial dominance and held that she did exercise it beneficently (91–99, 104, 159–163). This is a demanding remit for B.: he has to fit into his argument Polybius’ fairly numerous criticisms of Roman acts that were less than disinterested, in fact sometimes frankly unscrupulous (74–85). In idealistic or at least theoretical terms, certainly, Polybius praises the quest by states for imperial mastery: “it is a finer and nobler thing [than mere domestic stability] to be a world-class leader, with an extensive dominion and empire” (6.50.3).¹ Philip II and Alexander “raised the Macedonian empire from a most insignificant monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent” (8.10.6, cf. 8.10.8–11). To B. (65–66), Polybius likewise shows he approves of imperialism by praising Athens and Sparta for competing, however unsuccessfully, for “the finest objectives” (περὶ τῶν καλλíστων)—the domination of Greece (38.2 and 3). Certainly, too, he often ascribes to the Romans the aim of achieving universal dominion, and often makes clear how he admires both their excellent institutions and their many acts of generosity or moderation toward defeated or weaker states (67–68, 70–72). From these statements B. infers admiration for Roman imperialism, as also from the many comments on how extraordinary, irresistible, and instructive a phenomenon this was (91–97, 173–174). Yet such an inference is not automatically compelling. Arguably Polybius’ attitude is more nuanced.

Striving for hegemony was noble and memorable; how it was exercised could be different. Polybius is often critical of hegemony in action: not just of Sparta’s mistreatment of the Thebans, Messenians, and others (4.27; 6.49–50), and of Macedon’s toward other states, especially under Philip V (B., 66–67, 88–89, 93–94), but also—and often—of Rome’s. Quite early on he identifies Roman greed for booty as one cause of the First Punic War (1.11; B., 11, 68), and he remarkably disparages Rome’s seizure of Sardinia in 237 as “an act of sheer injustice” with “no reasonable pretext or justification” (3.28; cf. 1.88). He even hints, very circumspectly, that Rome was responsible for the Second Punic War: had Hannibal named the genuine crime of Sardinia as the provocation, he would have shown that he was right to fight; instead, he rashly invented a false pretext (3.15.10–11; B., 128, ignores the hint).

Further criticisms develop as the historian reaches his own time, as B. shows (74–86, 173). For instance in 180 the senate accepted the Achaean Callicrates’ selfishly pragmatic advice—as Polybius saw it—to favour pro-Roman Greek leaders at all costs; a decade and a half later Rome made unedifying efforts to keep both Egypt and the Seleucid realm weak, while Masinissa of Numidia was allowed to purloin Carthaginian territories on flimsy pretexts. In 157/6 the senate used a mere pretext to engineer a war over in Dalmatia so as to maintain citizens’ martial spirit and compel the Dalmatians to obedience. And, notoriously, the...