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HOW CAN BERKELEY BE REFUTED? IRobert McRae Berkeley's theory about the physical world has for many the appearance of an extreme and very ingenious paradox. For this reason it has more often prompted the question "How can it be refuted?" than any other theory in the history of philosophy. Whiston, Newton's successor at Cambridge, and one of the first to whom Berkeley sent a copy of his Principles, appealed in vain to the most distinguished philosopher in England to find a refutation . "I went to Dr. aarke," he says, "and discoursed with him about it to this effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. Berkeley's subtle premises, though I did not at all believe his absurd conclusion. I therefore desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties, but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusion, would answer him, which task he declined." Perhaps, as Boswell thought, it was hopeless to try. He was so impressed by the ingenuity of Berkeley's "sophistry" that he told Dr. Johnson it was impossible to refute it. In the two and a half centuries since the publication of the Principles and the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous various attempts at refutation have been made. The mere fact of the diversity of the methods employed gives rise to the question: which, if any of them, represents the proper way of refuting a philosophical theory? It may perhaps be instructive to look at four of the best known of these attempts with this question in miod. Each happens to represent a totally different conception of how the task is to be performed. We can see from the way that Whiston put the question to aarke what he considered to be involved io the refutation of a philosophical theory. As a mathematician it was not unnatural for him to suppose that such a theory was a conclusion resting on a proof. If he is correct in supposing this to be the case, then refutation could consist io showiog that the premisses of the demonstration were false, or io showiog that 224 R. F. MCRAE there was a logical fallacy in the steps of inference from premisses to conclusion, or, thirdly, in finding a proof for the contrary of the theory in question, and thereby showing it to be false. The last of these methods is employed by Dr. Johnson and by Kant. They pay no attention to any so-called premisses or inferences in Berkeley's arguments; they merely prove the contrary of his thesis. Since, however, Dr. Johnson's proof took the form of an action, accompanied only by the words, "I refute it thus," there is room for too much speculation as to what the import of his action was, and we shall be on safer ground in looking only at the example given by Kant of this kind of refutation. Showing a logical fallacy in the proof is the method employed by Professor R. B. Perry in refuting Berkeley. There are two other methods of refutation employed against Berkeley which do not concern themselves with proof; that is to say, they neither seek to refute him by proving a contrary thesis nor seek any logical fallacy in his proofs. One of these is Professor G. E. Moore's. It is the method of analysis. The other is Hume's. Like Whiston , Hume regards Berkeley's theory as resting on a proof, but like Boswell and unlike Whiston, he is quite prepared to regard this proof as impeccable, and he makes no attempt to controvert it. The weapon to be used against the theory is one which would destroy it by destroying all philosophical theory. This is the most radical species of refutation that is possible, and with it we may begin. Hume's starting point is the fact that Berkeley's theory is unbelievable. Berkeley's arguments, he says, "admit of no answer and produce no conviction . Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism."l Hume's statement seems to carry all the weight of common sense. It is still...

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