Latin America's Wars: Vol. I, The Age of the Caudillo, 1791-1899 (review)

During the nineteenth century, Latin America witnessed a dreadful level of international and internal conflict. In many regions, the continual loss of life and destruction of property created great obstacles to peaceful economic development and an ordered political system. The nature of war during this period gave rise to the Latin American caudillo—the military leader who employed violence as a means of securing his own political and economic position.

Robert Scheina offers an interesting panorama of the Latin American wars of this era. The topic is so large that the volume is necessarily a reference work rather than a monograph. In the preface and introduction, Scheina briefly analyzes the different nature of conflicts—civil wars, international conflicts, and revolutions or rebellions. He then outlines the various causes of wars in this era, such as racial conflict, natural resources, boundaries, secessions, Indian wars, class struggles, and so on. Whether they agree with him or not, future scholars will undoubtedly refer to this schema of causation.

The remainder of the chapters present individual conflicts (or groups of conflicts), beginning with the Haitian War of Independence and ending with the Spanish-American War. The author classifies each chapter according to this list of causes. He gives a short description of the "spark" that instigated the war, presents some brief background, describes the opposing forces, and discusses their strategies. He then summarizes the military actions of the war, often making insightful comments on leadership, military technology, geographical problems, and military capabilities of the parties involved. Each chapter concludes with some short observations that are often quite cogent and insightful.

Much of the conflict of this era was "feudal" in nature. Landowners and other elites raised forces from their clients (generally peasants beholden to their landlord) and then marched off to do battle, much as did feudal lords in medieval times. The forces of regionalism favored such ventures, and while the armies were often small, the conflicts were no less bloody. The personalistic nature of this type of warfare meant that political ideology often took a backseat to personal ambitions. All too often, "conservatives" became "liberals" and vice versa. The author emphasizes that political power in many countries depended almost entirely upon military prowess rather than administrative skills or wise economic management of the nation's resources. For that reason, historians should not wonder at the rise of such disastrous administrators as Antonio López de Santa Ana of Mexico or Mariano Melgarejo of Bolivia.

Foreigners frequently participated in these wars. Major powers such as the United States, France, Great Britain, and Spain used their regular armies and navies to achieve their own national ends. Filibusterers such as William Walker of the United States and Gaston de Raousset de Boulbon of France turned Latin America's wars into a "do it yourself" grab for power or territory. Idealistic volunteers such as Giuseppe Garibaldi in the Río de Plata rubbed elbows with the most opportunistic, greedy mercenaries from the United States or Europe. In some instances, entire units of foreigners enlisted together—such as Rooke's British Legion (composed of veterans of the Peninsular War), who subsequently took up service in Simón Bolivar's liberating army.

This volume surely has merits as a reference work, but there are some problems nevertheless. The author's choppy style may prove a bit disconcerting, and the lack of campaign maps is an obstacle to an understanding military developments. (Although, to the author's credit, we must assume that campaign maps were not included due to space concerns.) Finally, specialists will undoubtedly find omissions of minor border skirmishes, Indian campaigns, or civil pacification. For instance, Scheina mentions neither the Indian raids out of the Gran Chaco in South America...