Introduction

Southeast Asia in 2013 remained resilient in the face of economic, political, and security challenges. It maintained an estimated economic growth rate of 5.2 per cent, slightly below the 5.4 per cent achieved in 2012, despite slower growth in China and India and only nascent recoveries in Europe and the United States, which did not do much to change subdued external demand for Southeast Asian economies. There was considerable diversity in performance and challenges faced at the country level, as Sanchita Basu Das elaborates in her chapter “Southeast Asian Economies: Waiting for a Rebound” in this volume. Economic growth is expected to pick up in 2014.

Geopolitics drew more attention. The East China Sea tensions escalated and Sino-Japanese relations continued to deteriorate. On the South China Sea, there were some signs of flexibility on the part of China on multilateral discussions with ASEAN on a Code of Conduct but otherwise the situation remained unchanged. Major power engagements with Southeast Asia increased further during the year because of the perceived importance of the region to their interests, which was, on balance, a plus for the region and for ASEAN. In domestic politics, the situation in Thailand caused particular unease.

This Introduction attempts to bring together some of the salient themes in this volume, while recognizing that they are not exhaustive and will not do justice to all the authors. The four themes selected are: enhanced major power engagement; ASEAN developments; political stability and change; and internal violence manifested in insurgencies and terrorism.

Enhanced Major Power Engagement

The increased tempo of major power engagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN is highlighted both by Joseph Liow/Rajni Gamage and Malcom Cook in their respective chapters. China’s engagement continued at a high level, including visits by President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Li Keqiang to several countries, with offers to boost investments, trade, and connectivity. The United States continued to build on its strategy of “re-balance” to the region militarily, diplomatically and economically, even though President Obama had to miss a cluster of high level meetings including the US-ASEAN Summit and the East Asian Summit (EAS) because of pressing domestic concerns. Negotiations for a high quality trade deal through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) continued, but could not be concluded by the end of the year. Doubts also arose whether the US Congress would grant the President the fast track negotiating authority needed to finalize the deal. Cook, in his chapter “Southeast Asia and the Major Powers: Engagement not Entanglement”, draws attention to the significant ways in which India impacts Southeast Asia, including the manner its “abnormal and successful services export-oriented model” is diversifying Southeast Asian economies and Southeast Asia-India ties. Yet, as Liow and Gamage remind us, a striking feature of the year was the impressive strides in engagement with Southeast Asia made by Japan, an outcome of a strong bipartisan consensus formed in Japan in the last few years for adopting a firm response to China. Japan, which sees Southeast Asia as critical to its strategic interests, is boosting both economic and security links and partnerships with Southeast Asian states, and is emerging as an alternative supplier of military training, capacity building and eventually arms as it relaxes restrictions on arms exports. Japan’s trade and investment in Southeast Asia also increased in part as a result of diversion from China.

In his chapter, Cook argues that heightened, and often competitive, major power policy engagement with Southeast Asia and ASEAN need not be negative for the region as it brings clear benefits and new opportunities. However, certain factors have prevented Southeast Asian states from taking full advantage of the opportunities, including an overestimation of the influence of China and the corresponding need to adjust to it; tensions and differences between ASEAN members involved in disputes with China and those that are not; and fear of being caught in major power rivalries, and being forced to take sides. Cook argues that the chances of great power hegemony or a US-China military conflict in Southeast Asia are low, and if a full-blown conflict were to break out...