In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

SOME ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION RICHARD REDLER ALTHOUGH the reconstruction of Europe presents what is probably the greatest challenge to the intelligence of our generation, the literature on the subject is as yet surprisingly thin. Up to thi·s war, Europe was the centre of gravity of world affairs. The old continent has lost this role of leadership. Politically it will represent a "vacuum of power.," as General Smuts pointed out in his remarkable address to the Empire Parliamentary Association; economically it will also be 'thrown off balance to such a'n extent that its rehabilitation will largely depend on extra-continental forces, on the policies of the three great world powers who will be the trustees of the new Europe. The shape of these policies of Great Britain, the United·States and Soviet Russia has not yet been unfolded by the Allied leaders. This is one reason why the problem of European reconstruction at this stage defies a truly scientific analysis. Besides the uncertainties as to the ultimate plans of the Big Three, the problems in themselves are so vast that any attempt to sum them up requires of necessity an almost inadmissible degree of generalization and over-simplification. The writer is perfectly aware of the' artificial character of a study which ignores the political issues involved. Europe is composed of enemy states, of occupied Allied countries (where, with the exception of Poland, Quisling regimes are collaborating with the enemy against the will of the overwhelming majority of the populations concerned) and of four neutrals. Naturally our approach to the problems of rehabilitation will sharply distinguish between the aggressors and the victims, and perhaps even between the more or less friendly neutrals; but that distinction it has not been possible to follow through 1n this study. Indeed the present paper does not pretend to offer any practical solutions. Enough if it can expose some of the revolutionary changes which have taken place and which have transformed the continent as we had known it in the interval between the two world wars. * * * To talk about Continental Europe as an entity is only possible·at the price of very broad generalizations. However, the most 367 368 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO QUARTERLY conspicuous fact in the picture of the Europe of 1943 as compared with that of 1939 is that from an economic and administrative point of view the continent has become more _ integrated than it-ever was in history. It is a fact. which has received little attention in our thinking about Europe. Most experts would probably agree that some measure of integration_was due and likely to come about in this generation, even if no German occupation,·and no isolation ff-om the outside world, had occurred. We observe a similar trend in other parts of the world. Soviet Russia, though a political unit for centuries, has only in the last twenty years integrated its economy and effectively welded East and West together. In the British Empire and Commonwealth a policy of economic integration was successfully initiated with the Empire preferences at the Ottawa Conference. The Good Neighbour Policy of the United States during this period has also tended towards closer economic links between the different parts of the vyestern Hemisphere. And in the Far East, Japan was, of course, applying the same ruthless methods as Germany in order to build a huge economic empire which she ironically calls "The Greater CO-Prosperity Sphere." H owever, none of the aforementioned areas, with the exception of Soviet Russia, has become as closely knit together as Continental Europe under Nazi rule. A Europe without Great Britain, Soviet Russia, Turk,ey, andwhat is more-without the colonial possessions of the continental powers, may seem a very artificial product. It is obvious that the French, Dutch and Belgians will resume after the liberation of the homeland the closest possible relations with their overseas possessions .t And Great Britain and Soviet Russia will be decisive partners in the continental economy after the war (if they are not to be a part of it, as some exponents of a division of Europe into two spheres of influence seem to envisage). However, such a 'reduced Continental Europe...

pdf

Share