Collingwood’s “Reformed Metaphysics” and the Radical Conversion Hypothesis

Collingwood scholars have always been divided concerning his so-called radical conversion regarding the role of metaphysics. In particular, the radical conversion hypothesis refers to two alleged changes in Collingwood’s thought after 1936. First, Collingwood did no longer make a distinction between philosophy and history and, second, he did no longer believe in metaphysics as a study of “the One, the True, and the Good.”

In this article, I try to expose the untenability of the radical conversion hypothesis by showing the incorrect character of three objections, raised against his so-called later concept of metaphysics. In order to do that, two things are necessary. First, the relevant passages from his work after 1936 must be situated in the context of his complete work, including his unpublished manuscripts. Second, a reconstruction is necessary of the philosophical climate in which Collingwood was working during the second half of the 1930s.