Al-Qaeda as an Adversary: Do We Understand Our Enemy?

Several recent books on al-Qaeda depict the organization as capable, committed, and bloodthirsty. The authors contend that further attacks, perhaps exceeding the scale of September 11, are likely and may even be inevitable. Indeed, they portray the United States as caught in an enduring struggle with Islamic extremism. Although the effort to arrest, kill, or disrupt al-Qaeda's leadership may be going extremely well, radical Islam appears to be thriving.

The bleak outlook, however, ignores several positive signs. Infighting among Islamists remains rampant, a perennial problem that al-Qaeda has managed to reduce but not eliminate. Islamist regimes such as the Taliban's Afghanistan have been overthrown, while revolutionary regimes in Sudan and Iran are now far less fervent. Nor have violent movements gained mass support in the Muslim world, as their bloody tactics alienate more Muslims than they attract.

This portrait of al-Qaeda as an adversary suggests several policies. First, many of the bromides regarding counterterrorism in general—often drawn from struggles against small, left-wing European groups with at best limited popular appeal—do not apply to al-Qaeda. Its size, dedication, and popular appeal make it unusually, perhaps uniquely, formidable. Second, one must be wary of confusing al-Qaeda with its many affiliates and of confusing these violent radical groups with the broader political Islamist movement. Third, the United States must reengage its allies, ensuring that its counterterrorism strategy is robust enough to maintain their support. Fourth, public diplomacy, always an American weakness, must go from an episodic and underfunded foreign policy instrument to a major tool of national power. Fifth, al-Qaeda's unusually innovative nature requires the United States to try to defend not only against obvious methods such as truck bombs but also against new means like surface-to-air missiles and sustained suicide bombing campaigns. Sixth and finally, political leaders must engage the public to increase the ability of the United States to stand fast in the event of another major attack.