On Being ‘‘Advantageously Unsuited’’ for Dealing with Evil

I investigate epistemic limits intrinsic to the analytic method of philosophizing used by Michael Rea (Analytic Theology) and Eleonore Stump (Wandering in Darkness). Rea claims analytic tools limited strictly to the purposes of theory building make analytic accounts ‘‘advantageously unsuited to deal with the reality of evil.’’ Rea’s interpretation is conceptually distortive and problematic. I show how his use of the logical-practical distinction is unauthentic in dealing with the challenge of tragic evil and present a broad sketch of what I mean by ‘‘tragic.’’ I then elucidate how Rea abuses the epistemic limits of his method by misaiming analytic tools inasmuch as philosophical doubt cuts against any knowledge garnered in the epistemic practices of human beings experiencing evil. I lastly show that Rea’s epistemic problems amplify in the theodicy defence of Stump, who uses an artificial construction of evil as suffering of ‘‘mentally fully functioning adults’’ shorn of any socio-historical location. While Stump’s artifice of evil and epistemic doubt provides her the possibility for a general reason of moral sufficiency, she is unable to integrate the biblical narratives she expects will lend added epistemic assistance to her defence, so that her project ultimately founders by never really touching ground.