In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Saving Global Fisheries: Reducing Fishing Capacity to Promote Sustainability by Samuel J. Barkin and Elizabeth R. DeSombre
  • Rachel G. Tiller
Barkin, Samuel J., and Elizabeth R. DeSombre. 2013. Saving Global Fisheries: Reducing Fishing Capacity to Promote Sustainability. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.1

While it is common knowledge that fish stocks are declining because of overfishing, and despite the equally common knowledge that reducing capacity could easily ameliorate the situation, few authors go beyond explaining the problem to offer conceptual suggestions for ensuring future sustainability of the marine environment. In Saving Global Fisheries, authors Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth DeSombre skillfully demonstrate their knowledge and understanding of both global and national capture fisheries. They also describe in depth the complex political, economic, and social dynamics causing the fishing industry to proliferate at its current rate of harvest, much to the regret of the authors (and with disastrous effects on the environment).

The book is divided into The Problems (Part I) and Proposed Solutions (Part II). In Part I, Barkin and DeSombre lay the conceptual foundations for the book, first introducing and highlighting the institutional framework of global fisheries, focusing primarily on the macro scale and highlighting core challenges to both the institutional system and ecosystem. These challenges are grounded in the fact that fish are common pool resources (CPR) and “free” for the taking. This leads to overcapacity, with too many boats racing to chase too few fish. Though this overcapacity should encourage fishers to exit the industry, the CPR nature of fish and the large up-front capital investments instead create a “balloon effect” of fishers simply moving their effort to other regions, increasing pressure on other stocks instead. A primary reason for this, the authors argue, is that regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) only focus on speciesor region-specific micro-regulation. This focus, combined with the lack of a meta-fisheries organization, set the stage for the proposed solutions offered in Part II.

The authors argue that the reason for the balloon effect, despite the clear evidence of its negative effect on the environment, is industry capture of the regulatory process both nationally and internationally. They make a good case for the argument that this has led to the industry, rather than the fish, being the focus of regulatory protection. They offer ample evidence that is both convincing and disconcerting. [End Page 129]

Barkin and DeSombre then move to discussing subsidization of the fishing industry nationally, which is where they argue much of the problem of overcapacity and overfishing lies. Part I ends by underscoring the negative effects of fisheries being suggested as a tool for economic growth in developing nations, challenging the famous proverb, Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime.

Rather than just describing these challenges to the management of global fisheries, though, the authors take it a step further in Part II and offer a conceptualized solution: a new international institutional structure—a global fisheries organization—at a level above the RFMOs. This organization would coordinate, regulate, and deal with overcapacity and the balloon problem of global fisheries. Barkin and DeSombre also emphasize that this meta-organization would need to be environmentally focused and not subject to industry capture, and they offer suggestions as to how this could come about. They emphasize preserving the RFMOs, which is worth noting, since, despite their deep criticism of the organizations’ efficacy, they acknowledge that RFMOs are central to the solution, albeit with an evolutionary expectation of diminished industry capture and more “greening” within their regulatory bodies. The key that the authors discuss for potentially opening these doors is a brand new international institutional structure for global fisheries management, that will administer the global equivalent of individual transferable quotas (ITQs), international tradable permits (ITPs), in all waters outside nations’ exclusive economic zones. The new regime would have to be an “informational clearinghouse” for data gathered by existing RFMOs, would have a regulatory function at the macro scale that deals explicitly with the balloon problem through ITPs, and would require an environmental, rather than industrial, orientation. This suggestion challenges the notion of the...

pdf

Share