The Later Thirty Years War: From the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia (review)

Despite its central place in the concept of an early modern "military revolution," the military dimension of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) has received relatively little attention from modern historians. William Guthrie's new study on the last thirteen years of the conflict is a companion volume to his Battles of the Thirty Years War: From White Mountain to Nordlingen 1618-1635 (Greenwood, 2002) and follows a similar format with each chapter covering one or two major land actions in roughly chronological order. In each case, there are summaries of the broader strategic situation, as well as brief biographies of the main commanders, orders of battle and a detailed blow-by-blow account of the engagement. Eight engagements are covered in depth: Wittstock (1636), Rheinfelden (1638), Second Breitenfeld (1642), Rocroi (1643), Freiburg (1644), Jankau (1645), Allerheim (1645) and Zusmarshausen (1648). In addition, Vlotho (1638), Wolfenbüttel (1641) and Mergentheim (1645) receive reasonably full treatment and there are brief summaries of the main Franco-Spanish actions, including Lens (1648).

The book displays the same strengths and weaknesses as its companion volume. The "handbook" format results in much of the text comprising fairly indigestible lists and tables, many of which are largely duplicated by further material in the appendices to each chapter. This repetition is compounded by the reproduction of large passages from the first volume in the opening chapter of the new book. The orders of battle have been reconstructed from published sources and while they appear plausible, it is not always clear how much they derive from conjecture. Discussion of the wider political context largely follows older interpretations of the war and misses a lot of the, admittedly very complex, politics of the Empire. All this is unfortunate, because there are numerous interesting insights into military developments buried in the text that could have profitably been systematised in a concluding chapter. Tactical and technological change is presented as evolutionary rather than revolutionary as various commanders responded to previous experience and changed circumstances.

Considerable emphasis is placed on the ability and personality of the individual commanders, with the "imbalance in talent" between the Habsburgs and their opponents being more significant in their defeat than social, economic, political, or financial factors (p. 233). While this is perhaps pushing a good point too far, the author is right to note how the imperial and Bavarian generals of the 1640s carried their experience of the Westphalian theatre when they assumed command in southern Germany. The changing character of the later engagements is also well captured in the discussions of Second Breitenfeld and Rocroi that indicate that the growing use of linear fire tactics meant that battles could no longer be decided by the intervention of individual units. By offering the most detailed coverage in English of the neglected later stage of the war, the book should shift Anglophone discussion away from the great Gustavus Adolphus towards a more balanced treatment of the entire conflict.