By Order of the Kaiser (review)

Terrell Gotschall's By Order of the Kaiser provides readers with a history of the early development of the Prussian and later German Navy. Gotschall asserts that the prevailing concentration on the Imperial German Navy beginning in 1897, with the tenure of State Secretary of the Navy Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, offers an incomplete history of Germany's naval power. In the author's view, the period before 1897 is equally important as it laid the foundation for the development of the Imperial German Navy of World War I and is necessary in order to provide a complete picture of the transformation of the navy from a coastal defense force to a battle fleet. Gotschall uses the career of Admiral Otto von Diederichs, who served between 1865 and 1902, as the vehicle for examining this era.

The use of Diederichs's career is a fine choice for a work that highlights the pre-Tirpitz era navy, as he was present during phases of its early operational, technological, and organizational development. The first four chapters cover the period between 1843 and 1890, where the reader is exposed to a German naval strategy that focused on coastal defense with a limited ability to protect German interests overseas. Study of Diederichs's career also reveals the growth of the administration of the navy, developments in education, and the introduction of new technology such as the torpedo. Finally, it provides a reader with a history of the service as seen through the eyes of someone who served in it, making the work an enjoyable read.

The next four chapters chronicle Diederichs's career between 1890 and 1902, during which time the Imperial German Navy transformed itself from a coastal defense force into a vehicle to project global power. Diederichs became a chief opponent of this agenda, which was championed by Secretary of the Navy Tirpitz. The coverage of this political battle is the strongest portion of Gotschall's work as it reveals the internal battle within German naval circles over matters that chiefly involved strategy and force composition. Diederichs disagreed with Tirpitz over the move away from coastal defense toward a blue-water navy comprised of battleships that would challenge Great Britain for command of the sea. The admiral believed that such a challenge was unwise considering Germany's primary need to defend against the ground forces of continental powers such as France and Russia. He also believed that any competition with Britain was fruitless and a naval war would result in defeat by a numerically superior Royal Navy.

Gotschall asserts in his last chapter, covering the period up to the admiral's death in 1918, that, although Diederichs's position did not carry the day, it was borne out through the experience of World War I. This conclusion is quite correct. Through the use of Diederichs's papers and a wealth of primary and secondary source material, Gotschall provides a penetrating look at the early German navy and draws a clear distinction between it and that of the Tirpitz era.